The court emphasized that the power to quash criminal proceedings should be sparingly and cautiously exercised, and the High Court should not make uncharitable comments or exceed its jurisdiction.

JUDGMENT :

Pattanaik, J. - Leave granted in both the matters.

2. These two appeals one by State of Kerala and another by the State Women's Commission as well as the alleged victim lady are directed against one and the same order of the High Court of Kerala. By the impugned Judgment and Order dated 4th November, 1997 the Division Bench of Kerala High Court in exercise of its extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India has quashed the crimi-nal proceedings as against five of the accused persons, namely Shri O.C. Kuttan, Shri G. Mohanan, Shri S. Suresh Kaimal, Shri Tony Antony and Shri K.C. Peter, on coming to a conclusion that the uncontroverted allegations made in the F.I.R. and other statements do not constitute the offence of rape.

3. On 23.7.1996, Seena gave a vivid account as to how she was being exploited and sexually harassed by large number of accused persons under threat, coercion, force, allurement and on the basis of the said statement, a case was registered as Crime No. 5/96 of Vanitha Police Station, Ernakulam. The case was registered under Sections 366-A, 372, 376 and 344 read with Section 34 Indian Penal Code The Police started investigating into the said allegations and in the course of investigation the victim girl was examined on 24.8.1996 and on 25.8.1996. These respondents filed writ petitions in the Kerala High Court praying therein that the F.I.R. and the Criminal Proceedings arising out of the said allegations should be quashed as against them since the allegations do not make out any offence so far as they are concerned. When those writ petitions were listed before the learned Single Judge, the learned Single Judge was of the opinion that the matter should be heard by a Division Bench to decide the question whether criminal proceedings could be quashed in exercise of extraordinary jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and that is how the matter was heard by the Division Bench. By the impugned Judgment, the Division Bench though indicated how the lady has unfolded her pathetic story as a victim of rape and narrated the events of her life right from the time when she went to school till she was arrested by the Police, but on comparison of the three statements of the victim girl and on entering into an arena of conjecture and improbability, came to the conclusion that the lady was more than 16 years of age when she came to Ernakulam and indulged in the activities of leading immoral life and further she was not put to force of death or hurt or her consent was obtained by putting her in fear of death or hurt and on the other hand it is she, who exercised her discretion to have sex with those persons whom she liked or got money and willingly submitted herself to the sexual activities and, therefore this is a fit case where the High Court would be justified in quashing the criminal proceedings as against those who have approached the Court.

4. Mr. Ramachandran, learned senior counsel, appearing for the State of Kerala and Ms. Indira Jaisingh, appearing for the Kerala Women's Commission, vehemently argued that in view of the graphic statements of the lady herself, the High Court committed serious error in preventing investigation against the accused-respondents, who happened to be very influential people of the society. The learned counsel also urged that the conclusion of the High Court that the lady was more than 16 years of age by sifting the materials and evidence on record at this stage was wholly unwarranted. It was further urged that the allegations made by the lady not only amounts to commission of offence of rape alone but also the offence under Immoral Traffic Act and the High Court never applied its mind to find out whether the allegations taken at their face value would constitute other offences for which the criminal case has been registered. According to the learned counsel for the appellants in the case in hand to quash the proceedings at the stage of