The central legal point established in the judgment is that a legislative measure related to land acquisition cannot be struck down under Article 31-A of the Constitution without a clear finding that the land sought to be affected was within the ceiling limit of each proprietor and in each's personal cultivation.

ORDER :

K.T. Thomas, J. - This appeal at the instance of the State of Haryana is directed against the judgment and order of a Full Bench of the Punjab and Haryana High Court dated 18.1.1995 reported in Jai Singh and others v. State of Haryana and others, 1995 (Vol. 1), Punjab Law Reporter 614 : 1995(1) RRR 623 (P&H).

2. We need not stretch the canvass wide matching with the lengthy judgment of the Full Bench as it itself has summed up the main controversy in para 60 of its judgment. The said paragraph is worth reproduction :

"In view of the observations cited above, Sections 2(g)(4) and 2(g)(6) of the Act of 1961 describe the land reserved for common purposes under Consolidation of Holdings Act, 1948 by application of pro rata cut to the holdings of the land owners within their ceiling limits as shamlat deh under the Act of 1961 and since these lands have been vested in the Panchayat the action is in violation of Article 31-A. Since definitions by Section 2(g)(4) and 2(g)(6) are so intermingled that no part can be segregated and held ultra vires and these sections having categorically transgressed the powers of the State for acquisition of land without compensation, these provisions cannot stand the test of constitutionality. It is immaterial that the transgression is open, direct or overt, disguised, covert and indirect. It is a piece of colourable legislation. Violation of Article 31-A is so manifest that it leaves no manner of doubt. I am of the considered view that Sections 2(g)(4) and 2(g)(6) are void being violative of Article 31-A of the Constitution of India. Writ of mandamus is, therefore, issued restraining the State of Haryana from enforming the provisions of Sections 2(g)(4) and 2(g)(6) of the Act of 1992."

We are afraid that the Full Bench has over-looked certain essentials of Article 31-A of the Constitution, the relevant extract of which is reproduce hereinafter :

31-A. Saving of laws providing for acquisition of estates, etc. -

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in Article 13, no law providing for

(a) the acquisition by the State of any estate or any right therein or the extinguishment or modification of any such rights, or......................

shall be deemed to be void on the ground that it is inconsistent with, or takes away or abridges any of the rights conferred by Article 14 or Article 19.

Provided.....................................

Provided further that where any law makes any provision for the acquisition by the State of any estate and where any land comprised therein is held by a person under his personal cultivation, it shall not be lawful for the State to acquire any portion of such land as is within the ceiling limit applicable to him under any law for the time being in force or any building or structure standing thereon or appurtenant thereto, unless the law relating to the acquisition of such land, building or structure, provides for payment of compensation at a rate which shall not be less than the market value thereof."

We have made a through search in the judgment under appeal in order to discover whether any finding was recorded by the High Court that the land sought to be affected by the legislative measure under challenge was within the ceiling limit of each of the respective proprietors and was in each's personal cultivation, be it factually or legally. That there is no such finding is conceded to by the learned counsel for the parties. Unless such finding was recorded in clear terms, the legislative measure could not have been struck down on the anvil of Article 31-A of the Constitution. In this view of the matter, we would rather have a complete decision from the High Court on the subject and therefore, necessarily, have to effect a remand to it, other questions not being adverted to and leaving those questions to the High Court to be re-affirmed or otherwise.

3. As a result, we allow this appeal, set aside the impugned judgment of the High Court and remit the matter back to it for re-deci