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2021 Supreme(SC) 1090
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.M. JOSEPH, PAMIDIGHANTAM SRI NARASIMHA, JJ.
Anapurna Jaiswal – Appellant
Versus
Indian Oil Corporation Ltd. And Ors. – Respondents
Civil Appeal No.6119 of 2021 (Arising out of SLP (C) No.36767 of 2016)
Decided on : 30-09-2021
Headnote:
Registration Act, 1908 - Section 47 - Transfer of Property Act, 1882 - Section 5, 105 – Appeal- Transfer of property – Lease - Time from which registered document operates - Advertisement was published by respondent inviting applications for grant of dealership of petrol pumps - Appellant made her application - On basis of evaluation done, appellant was placed in first position. While so it appears that on basis of complaint, matter was looked into and order came to be issued by which respondent took view that lease which was foundation for offer made by appellant would commence from date of approval of petrol outlet. This meant that possession over premises did not amount to a lease and on date of execution of lease deed lease had not come into force. lease deed was more like a firm offer than owned proposition – Held, appellant attempted to derive support from Section 47 of Registration Act, 1908. Section 47 of Registration Act, 1908 is only intended to give effect to lease deed which is registered at a later point of time than when it is executed. It is intended to provide that document which is registered will have efficacy on its own terms with effect from time when it was supposed to have come into effect under document. In other words, fact that it is registered at a later point of time could not detract from document commencing to operate when it would have commenced but for it not having been registered. In fact, if one applies Section 47 of Registration Act, to facts of this case it would not have effect of preponing period of lease as commencing from date of execution of lease. lease would operate on its terms and period of lease would commence only upon approval being granted despite it being registered - Result of this discussion is that appellant cannot be possibly entitled to benefit of 35 marks which is vouchsafed only for those applicants who inter alia had a long-term lease as on date of application - There is another aspect Court must bear in mind. Court are dealing with a case where what is sought is judicial review of decision to award largesse. A fairly large measure of free play in joints is vouchsafed to a public authority when it comes to understanding terms under which offer are made. Court cannot be oblivious to this aspect as well. fact that in rectification deed also which was executed much after date of advertisement and application an attempt is made to correct original lease deed and to indicate that it was as a result of an error that clause 1 which Court have referred to came to be inserted also would fortify us in our reasoning which Court have employed in finding that appellant is not entitled to 35 marks - Appeal dismissed.
JUDGMENT :
1. Leave granted.
2. An advertisement was published on 12.10.2011 by the respondent inviting applications for grant of dealership of petrol pumps. The appellant made her application on 11.11.2011. On the basis of the evaluation done, the appellant was placed in the first position. While so it appears that on the basis of complaint, the matter was looked into and order dated 12.11.2014 came to be issued by which the respondent took the view that the lease dated 08.11.2011 which was the foundation for the offer made by the appellant would commence from the date of approval of the petrol outlet. This meant that the possession over the premises did not amount to a lease and on the date of the execution of the lease deed the lease had not come into force. The lease deed was more like a firm offer than owned proposition. Thereafter, on 12.12.2014 the appellant got a rectification/clarificatory deed registered. Four representations were made by the appellant. The corporation rejected by order dated 25.02.2015 the request. This led to the Writ Petition, which stood dismissed by the impugned order.
3. We heard Ms. Kamini Jaiswal, learned counsel for the appellant and Ms. Priya Puri, learned counsel for the respondent-corporation.
4. Learned counsel for the appellant would take us to through the lease deed dated 08.11.2011 which was registered on the same day and point out that under the lease deed possession was handed over to the appellant by the lessor on 08.11.2011 itself. In this regard, she sought support from clause 7 of the said lease deed which reads as follow: -
“7. That, in case, the petrol pump is not approved, then, the second party shall have to hand over the land transferred on rent to the first party.”
She would, therefore, point out that the lease deed had come into effect on 08.11.2011. Clause 1 reads as follow: -
“1. That, the period of this lease-deed will be 30 years, which shall take into account w.e.f. date of approval of petrol pump.”
5. She pointed out that this cannot detract from the lease coming into being in law on 08.11.2011. The lease bearing life from 08.11.2011 is consistent with and supported by the fact that the appellant derived possession on the said date under the said lease deed. In this regard, she also drew our attention to Section 47 of The Indian Registration Act, 1908 which reads as follows: -
“47. Time from which registered document operates. - A registered document shall operate from the time which it would have commenced to operate if no registration thereof had been required or made, and not from the time of registration.”
6. She would further point out that the action of dislodging the appellant from the first position she has rightfully earned was based on an alleged complaint. She pointed out with reference to the document at page 117A produced along with the rejoinder affidavit, that it is a clear case where the complaint is sprung up which is not genuine which can be seen from the fact that after serial No. 333 in place of serial No.334, serial No.335 is over written.
7. Per contra, Ms. Priya Puri, learned counsel for the respondent-corporation supported the impugned judgment. She would point out that letter of intent has already been issued in terms of the decision which is upheld by the High Court in favour of another party. However, on the basis of the order of status quo passed by this Court, effect could not be given to the decision.
8. The appellant undoubtedly secured 85.93 marks. A part of the 85.93 marks is attributable to 35 marks which she derived on the basis of her being a lessee under lease deed dated 08.11.2011 which we have adverted to. The relevant provision under which marks were awarded in this regard to her reads as follow: -
| Parameter | Sub-heads | Description | Max Marks | Evaluation |
| Capability to provide land and infrastructure/facilities (Max. | ||||
