1. Appeal against High Court order reversing a decree of dissolution of marriage under Section 13(1)(ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955. (Para 1 , 3 )
Back
Next 
2022 Supreme(SC) 535
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
K.M. Joseph, Hrishikesh Roy, JJ.
N. Rajendran – Appellant
Versus
S. Valli – Respondent
Civil Appeal No. 3293 of 2012
Decided on : 03-02-2022
Important Points
IMPORTANT POINTS
(1) Divorce – Consent of parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved – A dead marriage must be given a decent quietus.
(2) Matrimonial Proceedings – Bar of limitation – Word ‘proceedings’ within meaning of Section 29(3) of Limitation Act, 1963 is to be confined to original proceedings.
(1) Divorce – Consent of parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved – A dead marriage must be given a decent quietus.
(2) Matrimonial Proceedings – Bar of limitation – Word ‘proceedings’ within meaning of Section 29(3) of Limitation Act, 1963 is to be confined to original proceedings.
Subject
Matrimonial - DISSOLUTION OF MARRIAGE
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Sections 13(1)(ia) – Constitution of India – Article 142 – Divorce – Cruelty by wife – Consent of parties is not necessary to declare a marriage dissolved – Whatever life was there in marriage has been snuffed out by passage of time, appearance of new parties and vanishing of any bond between parties – Not even slightest possibility of rapprochement between appellant and respondent exists for reasons though which are entirely due to actions of appellant and for which respondent cannot be blamed – Marriage between appellant and respondent has become dead – It can be described as a point of no return – There is no possibility of appellant and respondent stitching together any kind of a reasonable relationship as tie between parties has broken beyond repair – It would be in interest of justice and to do complete justice to parties – While Court refuse to grant a decree of dissolution on ground of cruelty by respondent, in exercise of power under Article 142 of Constitution declare marriage between appellant and respondent as dissolved – This will be on condition that appellant will pay sum of Rs.20,000,00/- to respondent within a period of eight weeks – This will be without prejudice to all rights available to son who was born in marriage between appellant and respondent under law in regard to property rights – Till amount is paid appellant will continue to be liable to pay Rs.7000/- per month to respondent. (Paras 32 and 34)
(B) Limitation Act, 1963 – Section 29(3) – Family Courts Act, 1984 – Section 19 – Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 – Sections 28 – Matrimonial Proceedings – Bar of limitation – Intent of legislature was to take in proceedings before original court by way of a petition as are contemplated in various provisions of Hindu Marriage Act – Family Courts Act is not a standalone Act – It draws sustenance from Acts like Hindu Marriage Act – Word ‘proceedings’ within meaning of Section 29(3) is to be confined to original proceedings – There is nothing inconsistent in Section 12 read with Section 29(2) of Limitation Act with Section 19 of Family Courts Act – It is in interest of parties and also society at large that a period of limitation is fixed within which verdict of Court at bottom of judicial hierarchy is called in question. (Paras 20, 24 and 26)
Facts of the case:
By impugned judgment, the High Court has reversed the decree of dissolution of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent which is passed under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
Findings of Court:
Respondent is blameless in the matter but the facts as they have unfolded and the developments which have taken place, render it unavoidable for us to consider dissolution of marriage as the best course open in the interest of justice.
Result : Appeal allowed.
Judgement Key Points
What is the effect of Article 142 of the Constitution on declaring a marriage dissolved despite absence of consent?
What is the correct interpretation and application of Section 29(2) and 29(3) of the Limitation Act in relation to Family Courts Act appeals?
What are the limits and conditions for dissolution of marriage on grounds of irretrievable breakdown or cruelty where one party remarries under Section 15 Hindu Marriage Act?
Legal Category Hierarchy
- family law
- practice and procedure
- constitutional law
Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) :K.S. Mahadevan, Swati Bansal, Varun Mudgal, Rangarajan R., Rajesh Kumar, Advocates
For the Respondent(s):Gautam Narayan, Asmita Singh, Advocates
For the Appellant(s) :K.S. Mahadevan, Swati Bansal, Varun Mudgal, Rangarajan R., Rajesh Kumar, Advocates
For the Respondent(s):Gautam Narayan, Asmita Singh, Advocates
Table of Contents
2. Whether the respondent's conduct constituted matrimonial cruelty and whether the appeal under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act was filed within the limitation period. (Para 4 , 5 , 6 , 7 )
3. The alleged cruelty was unsubstantiated; the appeal was within time as Section 12 of the Limitation Act applies to appellate proceedings under the Family Courts Act. (Para 8 , 9 , 10 , 19 , 20 , 21 , 24 , 25 )
4. Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act excludes only original matrimonial proceedings, not appeals; thus, Section 12 applies to exclude time taken for certified copies. (Para 20 , 21 , 25 )
5. High Court judgment affirmed on cruelty; marriage dissolved under Article 142 due to irretrievable breakdown, subject to payment of permanent alimony. (Para 34 )
6. Does the Limitation Act apply to appeals under the Family Courts Act?
Yes. Section 29(3) of the Limitation Act excludes only original matrimonial proceedings. Appeals are governed by Section 29(2), meaning provisions like Section 12, which allows for the exclusion of time taken to obtain certified copies, apply to appellate proceedings. (Para 20 , 21 , 25 )
7. When is it lawful for a party to remarry after a divorce decree under Section 15 of the Hindu Marriage Act?
Remarriage is lawful if there is no right of appeal, the time for appealing has expired without an appeal being presented, or an appeal has been presented but dismissed. (Para 11 , 27 )
8. Can a marriage be dissolved on the ground of irretrievable breakdown without the consent of both parties?
Yes. Under Article 142 of the Constitution, the Supreme Court can dissolve a marriage due to irretrievable breakdown to do complete justice, even without mutual consent, provided the spouse's financial interests are protected. (Para 29 , 30 , 32 )
JUDGMENT
K.M. Joseph, J.
By the impugned judgment, the High Court has reversed the decree of dissolution of the marriage between the appellant and the respondent which is passed under Section 13 (1) (ia) of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955.
2. We have heard Mr. K.S Mahadevan, learned counsel the appellant and Mr. Gautam Narayan, learned counsel for the respondent.
3. The appellant and the respondent were married as per the Hindu rites and customs on 29.08.1999. According to the appellant, there were certain differences between his sister and the respondent's brother, who were married to each other, which led to the appellant's sister returning to her parental house. Further, the case of the appellant is that the respondent left the appellant on 18.01.2000 and returned to her parental home. She did not return home. She stood accused of cruelty and accordingly, the divorce petition was filed on 05.03.2001 seeking dissolution. The Family Court allowed the petition by its decree dated 23.07.2004. An appeal was carried by the respondent before the Madras High Court under Section 19 of the Family Courts Act, 1984 and it was filed on 09.09.2004. According to the appellant, since the period for filing an appeal by the respondent had expired, he re-married on 31.10.2004 on the strength of the decree of dissolution dated 23.07.2004. He was served with the notice in the matter in May, 2005. Respondent, in fact, filed a petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights under Section 9 of the Hindu Marriage Act on 27.12.2004 and the same is still pending.
4. The learned counsel for the appellant, Mr. K.S Mahadevan, would submit that the High Court has clearly erred in reversing the judgment of the Family Court. He would submit that this is a case of matrimonial cruelty practised by the respondent. The Trial Court has after considering the evidence rendered a finding to justify the grant of dissolution of the marriage. It is pointed out that there was a strained relationship between the respondent and the appellant's sister. It must be noticed here that the appellant's sister was married to the brother of the respondent on 24.05.1999, prior to the marriage between the appellant and the respondent on 29.08.1999. It is pointed out that on the evidence, finding was rendered by the trial court that strain between the respondent and the appellant's sister had a telling effect on the relationship between the appellant and the respondent. The learned counsel for the appellant contended that the respondent would threaten to commit suicide. What is more, the learned counsel for the appellant would further contend that though the appellant requested the respondent to come back. But she refused, stating that in view of the fact that she had gone to deliver a child, she needed more time. She had requested for five months. In fact, the father of the respondent passed away on 03.02.2001. It is further contended that the attitude of the respondent is reflected by the admitted fact that the respondent did not file any petition seeking restitution of conjugal rights. If she was genuinely interested in coming back and staying with the appellant, she would have done that. It is pointed out further that the findings rendered by the High Court about there not being any strained relationship between the respondent and her sister-in-law is unsustainable. He pointed out the contradictions in the impugned judgment in this regard. He would contrast the finding that there was no such strain with the finding that there was a strained relationship between the families. The respondent was never willing to live with the appellant. The finding of the High Court that the respondent was always ready and willing to rejoin is criticized as being unsustainable on facts. It is pointed out in this regard that the intention to return was not reflected in the pleadings, and it finds expression for the first time in the evidence of the respondent only.
5. It is further contended that the findi
