The judgment established the importance of conscientious judicial scrutiny in cases involving 'reasonable doubt' and emphasized the need for sufficient corroborative evidence in criminal convictions.

JUDGMENT

Surya Kant, J. - Leave granted.

2. The appellant is wife of the defacto complainant Mani @ Allimuthu. After about 2 years of their marriage, the couple was blessed with a daughter. It appears that on account of appellant's failure to cook sufficient food for her inlaws, who visited their house, a quarrel took place between the husband and the wife. The appellant, unfortunately, decided to commit suicide and consumed a poisonous substance, Odeuvanthlai, which she also administered to their 10 months old daughter. The husband of the appellant, namely, the defacto complainant, had gone for work at that time and when he came back to his house after his work on 10102012, he found both the appellant and their daughter unconscious. They were taken to Vinayaga Mission Hospital, Salem where the baby girl died on 13102012. When the appellant gained consciousness, her purported Dying Declaration (Exhibit `P20') was recorded on 11102012 by learned Judicial Magistrate (P.W. 13). The appellant eventually survived. The husband of the appellant had meanwhile reported the matter to the Police, which led to registration of a case under Sections 302 and 309 of the Indian Penal Code (in short 'Code') against the appellant for causing the death of their daughter.

3. The appellant was put on trial, in which 14 witnesses were examined from the prosecution side, besides reliance on 23 documents.

4. The Principal Sessions Judge, Namakkal found the appellant guilty of the offences under Sections 304(1) and 309 of the Code and sentenced her under Section 304(1) to undergo imprisonment for one year along with fine of Rs.5,000/, in default whereof, she was required to undergo further imprisonment for three months. The appellant was also sentenced to undergo imprisonment for six months under Section 309 of the Code along with fine of Rs.1,000/.

5. The appellant preferred appeal before the High Court of Judicature at Madras, but her appeal was turned down by the High Court on the following premise:

'10. On reading of the entire materials EX.P20 recorded by P.W. 2 stated that being the dying declaration at the time when she was admitted in the hospital, the learned Magistrate recorded the statement from the appellant. The appellant has clearly admitted that she consumed poison due to the stomach pain and also she gave the poison to the child. The statement under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., made before the learned Judicial Magistrate, and the evidence of the doctor that she has consumed poison and the same was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.8. Therefore no other evidence is necessary to find out that the accused has committed the offence. The medical evidence also corroborated the same. The learned counsel for the appellant would submit that the accused was admitted in the Government hospital, Salem, but the medical certificate was not produced. FIR also registered after three days from the date of occurrence.

11. On considering the case, there was a wordy quarrel between the family members and due to the quarrel the accused suddenly taken the decision to consume poison and gave the same to her child also. Thereafter, she was admitted in Government hospital immediately. The statement recorded under Section 164 of Cr.P.C., from the deceased which was marked as Ex.P20 and which was corroborated by the evidence of P.W.8 doctor who has given treatment to the deceased Kanishka and the accused Vijaya.'

6. The question that arises for consideration is whether it is tenable to uphold the conviction of the appellant solely on the basis of her purported dying declaration (Exhibit `P20') which also appears to have been classified as a Statement under Section 164 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973, considering that Appellant has denied making any statement?

7. In this regard, there has been a clear and consistent approach taken by this Court toward a dying declaration when the individual in question subsequently survives. In State of U.P. v. Veer Singh (2004) 10