The court established that post-divorce criminal proceedings can be quashed if genuine settlements are present, while also respecting statutory limitations.

ORDER :

1. Leave granted.

2. Being aggrieved by the order dated 16.07.2018 passed by the High Court of Delhi in Crl. M.C. No.381/2016 and Crl. M.A. No.1618/2016, by which the application filed by the appellants under Section 482 of the Criminal Procedure Code, 1973 (for short “Cr.P.C.”) seeking quashing of order dated 28.09.2015 of the Court of the Metropolitan Magistrate taking cognizance of the offences under Sections 498A, 406, 34 of the Indian Penal Code (“IPC” for short) and issuing summons to the appellants herein as accused on the basis of the final report dated 22.09.2015 made under Section 173 of the Cr.P.C has been dismissed, the appellants are before this Court.

3. We have heard learned counsel for the appellants and learned counsel for the respondent-State. On perusal of the Office Report, it is noted that the second respondent-complainant is served but has not responded to the same and there is no representation on her behalf.

4. It is not in dispute that the marriage between appellant No.1 and Respondent No.2 took place on 01.11.1996. Thereafter, an ex-parte decree of Divorce was granted by the Family Court, Saket Courts Complex-South District, New Delhi dated 04.04.2013. Thereafter, a complaint was filed by respondent No.2 against appellant No. 1 on 31.10.2013. On the basis of said complaint, an FIR was registered on 13.02.2014, subsequent to the divorce decree passed by the Family Court on 04.04.2013. On conclusion of the investigation into the First Information Report No.20/2014 in respect of the complaint registered by respondent No.2 herein in Crime Against Women cell, Nanak Pura.

5. In the aforesaid circumstances, the appellants herein sought quashing of the complaint filed by respondent No.2 herein as well as all proceedings initiated pursuant to the said complaint by filing their application under section 482 of Cr.P.C. before the High Court. The High Court, however, dismissed the said application vide impugned order dated 16.07.2018.

6. Learned counsel for the appellants during the course of his submissions relied upon the following judgments of this Court:

1. Monica Kumar (Dr.) and Anr. vs. State of Uttar Pradesh and ors. (2008) 8 SCC 781.

2. Mohd. Miyan and Ors. vs. the State of Uttar Pradesh and Anr. (Crl. A. No.1048/2018) dt.21.08.2018.

3. Iqbal Alias Bala and Ors. State of U.P. and Ors. (2023) 8 SCC 734.

4. Malakar and Anr. vs. State of Uttarakhand and Anr. order dated 19.03.24.

7. Learned counsel for the respondent State however supported the impugned order and contended that there is no merit in this appeal.

8. This Court in the case of Ramawatar vs. State of Madhya Pradesh reported in (2022) 13 SCC 635, while considering quashing of proceedings under Section 482 of Cr.P.C. in the context of the provisions of the Scheduled Castes and the Scheduled Tribes (Prevention of Atrocities) Act, 1989, took into consideration the fact that there had been a settlement arrived at between the parties in the said case and therefore exercising jurisdiction under Article 142 of the Constitution of India had quashed the complaint and the FIR and the subsequent criminal proceedings against the accused therein. The relevant portions of the said judgment are at paragraphs 13, 14 and 15 which are extracted as under:

“13. We, however, put a further caveat that the powers under Article 142 or under Section 482 Cr.P.C., are exercisable in post-conviction matters only where an appeal is pending before one or the other Judicial forum. This is on the premise that an order of conviction does not attain finality till the accused has exhausted his/her legal remedies and the finality is subjudice before an appellate court. The pendency of legal proceedings, be that may before the final Court, is sine qua non to involve the superior court’s plenary powers to do complete justice. Conversely, where a settlement has ensued post the attainment of all legal remedies, the annulment of proceedings on the basis of a compromise would be impermissible.