JUDGMENT

SANJAY KAROL, J.

1. Leave Granted.

2. The application dated 31st August 2005 initiated by one Bhudeo Prasad Singh, for probate of a Will dated 15th April 1995 executed by one Shrilal Singhania, was rejected by the District Judge, Deoghar [Civil Court] under Section 222 and 276 of the Indian Succession Act, 1925 [ISA] by order dated 31st July 2012 as a consequence of an application having been made under Order VII Rule 11 of Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 [CPC] by the objectors-respondents herein. The High Court in terms of MA No.153 of 2012 which was dismissed by judgment dated 28th April 2022, agreed with the findings of the Civil Court. Hence this appeal.

Heard learned senior counsel for the parties.

3. The limited issue which presents for consideration is the whether the application for probate is barred by the law of limitation. The answer to this question is fairly straight forward. The ISA does not provide for any particular time period within which application for probate, or revocation thereof can be filed before the concerned Court. In these circumstances, the residuary provision of the Limitation Act, 1963 [1963 Act] i.e., Article 137 would be the relevant provision. It reads as under:

4. The primary ground that has been taken by the Courts below is that the application for probate was made in 2005 when the testator passed away a decade prior to 7th June 1995. This delay, in their considered view is unexplained and unjustified. At the outset we may state that we are unable to agree with such a view.

5. The probate of a Will has three -fold purposes- (a) It is a judicial stamp of approval on the genuineness of the Will; (b) It acknowledges the appointment of an executor of the Will; (c) It grants the executor to act for the purposes of the Will. Keeping this in view, the specific view that the period of limitation for probate commences from the death of the testator has been rejected. The Bombay High Court in Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani, 1983 SCC OnLine Bom 54 which has been quoted with approval by this Court in Kunvarjeet Singh Khandpur v. Kirandeep Kaur, (2008) 8 SCC 463 and Sameer Kapoor v. State, (2020) 12 SCC 480 except on one point held as under:

“15. Similarly reference was made to a decision of the Bombay High Court in Vasudev Daulatram Sadarangani v. Sajni Prem Lalwani [AIR 1983 Bom 268] . Para 16 reads as follows : (AIR p. 270)

“16. Rejecting Mr Dalpatrai's contention, I summarise my conclusions thus—

(a) under the Limitation Act no period is advisedly prescribed within which an application for probate, letters of administration or succession certificate must be made;

(b) the assumption that under Article 137 the right to apply necessarily accrues on the date of the death of the deceased, is unwarranted;

(c) such an application is for the court's permission to perform a legal duty created by a will or for recognition as a testamentary trustee and is a continuous right which can be exercised any time after the death of the deceased, as long as the right to do so survives and the object of the trust exists or any part of the trust, if created, remains to be executed;

(d) the right to apply would accrue when it becomes necessary to apply which may not necessarily be within 3 years from the date of the deceased's death;

(e) delay beyond 3 years after the deceased's death would arouse suspicion and greater the delay, greater would be the suspicion;

(f) such delay must be explained, but cannot be equated with the absolute bar of limitation; and

(g) once execution and attestation are proved, suspicion of delay no longer operates.”

Conclusion (b) is not correct while Conclusion (c) is the correct position of law.”

In both jud