A regulatory body's power to issue directions for ensuring compliance with statutory regulations is an administrative function, distinct from the adjudicatory power vested in a tribunal. Such directions do not constitute the adjudication of a dispute between parties and are therefore within the authority's jurisdiction.

JUDGMENT :

S.V.N. BHATTI, J.

1. The present Civil Appeal arises from the Order dated 10.03.2010 in Appeal No. 1(C) of 2009 of the Telecom Disputes Settlement and Appellate Tribunal (“TDSAT”), New Delhi, and is filed under Section 18 of the Telecom Regulatory Authority of India Act, 1997 (“TRAI Act”). The Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (“TRAI”) is the Appellant herein, and M/s Polimer Cable Network, Salem, Tamil Nadu/Respondent No. 1/Multi-System Operator (“MSO”), was the Appellant before the TDSAT. TRAI issued a Show Cause Notice dated 19.02.2009 to the Respondent herein, purportedly in exercise of its powers and jurisdiction under Sections 11 and 13 of the TRAI Act read with the Telecommunication (Broadcasting & Cable Services) Interconnection Regulations, 2004, as amended by the Telecommunication (Broadcasting & Cable Services) Interconnection (3rd Amendment) Regulation, 2006 (“IC Regulations”). The Respondent, challenging the Show Cause Notice, filed Appeal No. 1(C) of 2009 before the TDSAT. To appreciate the jurisdictional point canvassed by TRAI in the present Civil Appeal, the prayer made before the TDSAT by the MSO is excerpted hereunder:

“It is most respectfully prayed before this Hon’ble Tribunal that it may be pleased to: (a) pass orders quashing and setting aside the direction dated 21.10.2008 and the show-cause notice dated 19.02.2009 issued by the Respondent No. 1 as the same is without jurisdiction and is void ab initio”

2. TDSAT, while disposing of Appeal No. 1(C) of 2009, prefaced the following point for decision:

“Jurisdiction of Telecom Regulatory Authority of India (TRAI) to adjudicate on a dispute between one MSO with the LCO’s affiliated with it, is in question in this appeal.”

(emphasis supplied)

3. In the final analysis, TDSAT held as follows:

“In our opinion, in a situation of this nature, TRAI neither has any exclusive jurisdiction to determine a dispute nor a concurrent jurisdiction.

Breach of a contract gives rise to civil liability. In the event it is found that a party to the contract has suffered breach of contract, he may claim damages also. The Act does not envisage exercise of jurisdiction by the Tribunal both original and appellate in relation to the same nature of dispute. It also does not contemplate, that for one grievance, an aggrieved party may approach TRAI and for another, this Tribunal.

Statutory provisions, as is well known, must be read in their entirety. It must be read chapter by chapter, section by section and clause by clause to give effective meaning to the words employed.

The Act does not envisage different results from different Tribunals. We have noticed heretobefore that breach of a contract gives rise to a civil liability. If however for such a breach, a party to the contract approaches TRAI, which may issue direction, and in the event of breach of such direction wherefor report of the Police Authority may have to be called for, TRAI may take recourse to action under Section 29 of the Act which provides for a criminal liability. A provision leading to a penal consequence must be construed strictly.

We are, therefore, of the opinion that unless the statu[t]e otherwise provides for, in case of breach of the terms of a contract, two different kinds of liabilities ordinarily should not be faced by the same person viz. civil liability & criminal liability.

In our opinion having regard to the provisions of Section 14 of the Act