1. Appeal against high court conviction for murder under Section 302 IPC following the reversal of an initial acquittal by the sessions court in a dowry-related death case. (Para 1 , 2 )
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2026 Supreme(SC) 1333
SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
UJJAL BHUYAN, ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, JJ.
Sau. Kamalbai Waman Patil – Appellant
Versus
The State of Maharashtra – Respondent
Criminal Appeal No. 118 of 2018
Decided On : 05-11-2026
Important Points
A sole accused cannot be convicted under Section 302 read with Section 34 IPC if all co-accused are acquitted and no independent charge under Section 302 was framed. Furthermore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act applies only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden of proof.
Subject
Criminal Law - Homicide
Act Referred
Headnote
(A) Indian Penal Code, 1860 - Sections 302, 34 - Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Code of Criminal Procedure, 1973 - Section 386(a) - Conviction of sole accused where others are acquitted - When accused are charged under Section 302 read with Section 34 for committing murder in furtherance of common intention, and the court acquits all other co-accused, the sole remaining accused cannot be convicted under Section 302 if no independent charge under Section 302 simpliciter was framed - Such a conviction would amount to making out a new accusation, which is prejudicial to the accused. (Paras 14-18)
(B) Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge - Section 106 can be invoked only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden pointing to the involvement of the accused - It cannot be used to make up for the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence or to shift the burden before a prima facie case is established. (Paras 26-27)
(C) Dying Declarations - Multiple and inconsistent declarations - Where multiple dying declarations are inconsistent, the court must scrutinize each on its merits and look for corroboration from other reliable evidence, especially when the prosecution's case is otherwise fragile. (Paras 19-24)
Facts of the case:
The victim suffered severe burn injuries and succumbed to them. Three dying declarations were recorded; however, they were inconsistent regarding the identity of the perpetrators. The Trial Court acquitted all accused persons due to these inconsistencies and the non-examination of a material witness. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal of the mother-in-law, convicting her under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, while upholding the acquittal of the other three accused. The High Court relied on one specific dying declaration and the fact that the appellant was alone at home with the victim at the time of the incident.
Findings of Court:
The reversal of the acquittal was not called for. The High Court erred in convicting the appellant under Section 302 when the charge was framed under Section 302 read with Section 34, and all other co-accused were acquitted. Additionally, the High Court improperly relied on Section 106 of the Evidence Act before the prosecution discharged its initial burden and accepted an uncorroborated dying declaration among inconsistent statements.
Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant alone under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code when the charge was framed under Section 302 read with Section 34 and all other co-accused were acquitted, and whether the reliance on an inconsistent dying declaration and Section 106 of the Evidence Act was legally sound.
Ratio Decidendi: A court cannot convict a sole accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 if all other named co-accused are acquitted, as it would necessitate finding a conspiracy with unnamed persons not present in the charge, effectively creating a new case. Furthermore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its duty to prove the crime initially.
Result: Judgment of the High Court quashed; appellant acquitted.
(B) Evidence Act, 1872 - Section 106 - Burden of proving fact especially within knowledge - Section 106 can be invoked only after the prosecution discharges its initial burden pointing to the involvement of the accused - It cannot be used to make up for the inability of the prosecution to produce evidence or to shift the burden before a prima facie case is established. (Paras 26-27)
(C) Dying Declarations - Multiple and inconsistent declarations - Where multiple dying declarations are inconsistent, the court must scrutinize each on its merits and look for corroboration from other reliable evidence, especially when the prosecution's case is otherwise fragile. (Paras 19-24)
Facts of the case:
The victim suffered severe burn injuries and succumbed to them. Three dying declarations were recorded; however, they were inconsistent regarding the identity of the perpetrators. The Trial Court acquitted all accused persons due to these inconsistencies and the non-examination of a material witness. On appeal, the High Court reversed the acquittal of the mother-in-law, convicting her under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, while upholding the acquittal of the other three accused. The High Court relied on one specific dying declaration and the fact that the appellant was alone at home with the victim at the time of the incident.
Findings of Court:
The reversal of the acquittal was not called for. The High Court erred in convicting the appellant under Section 302 when the charge was framed under Section 302 read with Section 34, and all other co-accused were acquitted. Additionally, the High Court improperly relied on Section 106 of the Evidence Act before the prosecution discharged its initial burden and accepted an uncorroborated dying declaration among inconsistent statements.
Issues: Whether the High Court was justified in convicting the appellant alone under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code when the charge was framed under Section 302 read with Section 34 and all other co-accused were acquitted, and whether the reliance on an inconsistent dying declaration and Section 106 of the Evidence Act was legally sound.
Ratio Decidendi: A court cannot convict a sole accused under Section 302 read with Section 34 if all other named co-accused are acquitted, as it would necessitate finding a conspiracy with unnamed persons not present in the charge, effectively creating a new case. Furthermore, Section 106 of the Evidence Act does not absolve the prosecution of its duty to prove the crime initially.
Result: Judgment of the High Court quashed; appellant acquitted.
Legal Category Hierarchy
Advocates appeared:
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Dilip Annasaheb Taur- 2101, AOR Mr. Amol V Deshmukh, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Raman Yadav, Adv. Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande- 3259, AOR Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Ms. Deepsea Chakraborty, Adv.
For the Appellant(s) : Mr. Dilip Annasaheb Taur- 2101, AOR Mr. Amol V Deshmukh, Adv.
For the Respondent(s): Mr. Raman Yadav, Adv. Mr. Siddharth Dharmadhikari, Adv. Mr. Aaditya Aniruddha Pande- 3259, AOR Mr. Shrirang B. Varma, Adv. Ms. Deepsea Chakraborty, Adv.
Table of Contents
2. The appellant argued the reversal of acquittal was contrary to law due to inconsistent dying declarations and insufficient evidence, while the respondent maintained the decision was justified by evidence. (Para 11 , 12 )
3. The court found inconsistencies between dying declarations and noted that the prosecution failed to examine material witnesses, rendering the reversal of the original acquittal order by the High Court unsustainable. (Para 23 , 24 , 25 , 29 )
4. Constructive liability under Section 34 IPC cannot be used to convict a single accused when the common intention charge against multiple accused is rejected and acquittals are maintained. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 )
5. The conviction is set aside, the acquittal restored, and the appellant acquitted of all charges. (Para 30 )
6. Can an accused be convicted solely under Section 302 IPC when the conjointly charged co-accused are acquitted and no independent charge was framed?
No, convicting a single accused for substantive murder when they were only charged with co-conspiratory liability under Section 34 IPC—and all others are acquitted—amounts to making a new accusation, which is prejudicial and legally unsustainable. (Para 15 , 16 , 17 , 18 )
7. How should courts handle multiple, inconsistent dying declarations?
Courts must evaluate each declaration on its merits, check for material inconsistencies, and seek corroborative evidence. If inconsistencies are significant and the primary evidence is questioned, the prosecution fails to discharge its burden to prove guilt beyond reasonable doubt. (Para 19 , 20 , 24 , 29 )
8. Does Section 106 of the Evidence Act shift the burden of proof to the accused in the absence of a prima facie case?
No, Section 106 only applies after the prosecution has discharged its initial burden of establishing a prima facie case. It cannot be used to cover the prosecution's failure to provide foundational evidence of the accused's guilt. (Para 27 )
JUDGMENT :
ATUL S. CHANDURKAR, J.
1. The appellant questions her conviction by the High Court of Bombay, Bench at Aurangabad,1[For short, ‘the High Court’] for the offence punishable under Section 302 of the Indian Penal Code, 1860,2[For short, ‘Penal Code], as a result of which she has been sentenced to suffer rigorous imprisonment for life and to pay fine of Rs.25,000/-, in default, to suffer rigorous imprisonment for one year. By the impugned judgment, the acquittal of the appellant by the Sessions Court has been reversed.
2. The case of the prosecution in brief is that the son of the appellant-Shamkant, A1 was married with one Sunitabai. The couple was residing with Waman-A2, the father of A1 and Kamalbai-A3, the mother of A1. Jeejabrao, A4 is the younger brother of A1. It was alleged that all the accused were ill-treating Sunitabai on the ground that she was not having any issue from the marriage. There was also demand of dowry followed by physical and mental torture. Despite an earlier understanding between A1 and the family members of Sunitabai, her ill-treatment at the hands of all the accused continued. It was further alleged that on 10.04.2005 at about 10 a.m. in furtherance of their common intention, all the accused persons set Sunitabai on fire. On hearing some commotion, their neighbours had gathered there. Sunitabai was admitted to the Civil Hospital with burn injuries having been taken there by one Vishwas Desle. Her statement was thereafter recorded at 10.30 a.m. wherein she implicated the appellant as having thrown kerosene on her and having set her on fire. Sunitabai underwent treatment and her further statements were recorded by Prakash Wagh, Assistant Sub-Inspector of Police as well as by the Special Executive Magistrate. Ultimately on 15.04.2005, Sunitabai succumbed to her injuries. An offence was, accordingly, registered against all the accused. On completion of investigation, the case was committed to the Sessions Court. Charge was framed against A1 to A4 below Exhibit-8 for the offence punishable under Sections 498A, 342, 406 and 302 read with Section 34 of the Penal Code. The accused did not plead guilty and were, thus, tried.
3. To bring home the charge against all the accused, the prosecution examined Dr. Ajit Pathak at Exhibit-29 as PW-1. He was working as Associate Professor at the Civil Hospital. He stated that he had conducted the post-mortem examination of Sunitabai on 15.04.2005. He opined that the victim had suffered 90 % burns and that the cause of death was ‘Septicemia due to thermal burns’. The post-mortem report was at Exhibit-27. The father of Sunitabai, Subhash Patil was examined at Exhibit-36 as PW-2. He stated that Sunitabai was his second daughter and that she was married with A1. His daughter had narrated certain incidents of ill-treatment after which a meeting was held between members of both the families. In the said meeting, A1 had given a written assurance that he would not ill-treat his wife. He further stated that on getting information that his daughter had suffered burn injuries, he along with his relatives rushed to village Vinchur. His daughter had been admitted in the Civil Hospital where she stated that A1 and A4 had tied her hands and legs by a rope while the appellant had poured kerosene on her person and she was set on fire by A2. He identified the thumb impression of A1 on the stamp paper wherein a written assurance of good treatment was recorded. The same was at Exhibit-37.
4. Govinda Patil was examined as PW-3 below Exhibit-38. He was present at the Police Station where a panchnama was drawn in respect of a newspaper report, stamp paper of Rs.20 as well as a medical certificate of the victim. Prakash Wagh, PW-4 was examined below Exhibit-43. He stated that he was serving as Assistant Sub-Inspector and that on 10.04.2005, he had recorded the statement of the victim at the Civil Hospital. In the said statement, the victim had stated that A1 and A4 had tied her hands and le
