L. NARASIMHA REDDY, J.

( 1 ) PLAINTIFF in O. S. No. 1137 of 2000, in the Court of the IV Senior Civil Judge, City Civil Court, Hyderabad, filed this revision, under Article 227 of the Constitution of India, feeling aggrieved by an order passed by the trial Court, in an application filed under Section 11 (2) of Andhra Pradesh Court-Fees and Suits Valuation Act, 1956 (for short "the Act" ).

( 2 ) THE petitioner is a builder. It entered into an agreement with the respondents on 7-9-1997, for the purpose of developing the suit schedule property, by constructing multi-storied complex. Various terms and conditions were agreed upon. It is stated that a sum of Rs. 4,00,000/- was paid to the respondents towards refundable deposit. In addition to that, petitioner claimed that it paid a sum of Rs. 80,000/- towards rent under the agreement. The possession of the property was to be delivered to the petitioner within a particular time, so as to enable ittocommence construction. Alleging that the respondents violated the conditions and did not deliver the possession of the land, the petitioner filed the suitforspecific performance of the agreement, dated 7-9-1997. The suit is pending trial. The petitioner valued the suit at Rs. 4,80,000/-and paid the court-fee on that amount, under Section 39 of the Act.

( 3 ) RESPONDENTS filed I. A. No. 829of 2003, under Section 11 (2) of the Act, alleging that the petitioner is seeking delivery of possession of the land, which is worth Rs. 60,00,000/-, and in that view of the matter, the court-fee ought to have been paid under Section 29 of the Act. The application was resisted by the petitioner. The trial Court allowed the LA. , through its orderdated 25-9-2003. lt required the petitioner to value the suit under Sections 29 (and 39) of the Act and pay the court-fee accordingly.

( 4 ) SRI V. Ravi Kiran Rao, learned counsel for the petitioner, submits that the suit is filed for the relief of specific performance of an agreement, and court-fee thereon is payable under Section 39 of the Act. He contends that in a suit for specific performance, it is the consideration for promise that becomes relevant for the purpose of fixation of court-fee, and not the value of the property involved therein. He contends that the court-fee would become payable under Section 29 of the Act, if only the suit is filed for recovery of possession of a property, as of right, and to be retained after its delivery in the capacity of owner.

( 5 ) SRI P. Shiv Kumar, learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the relief claimed in the suit is such that it entails delivery of the possession of immovable property, and in that view of the matter, the only relevant provision is Section 29 of the Act. He points out that in the prayer of the suit, the petitioner insisted that the possession of the property be delivered to it, and as such, the court-fee ought to have been paid on three-fourths value of it.

( 6 ) THE controversy in this revision is about the provision of the Act, under which the suit is to be valued and court-fee is to be paid. At the beginning of the plaint, the petitioner described the nature of the suit as the one for "specific performance of development agreement". Its grievance is about the nondelivery of possession of the land, in pursuance of the development agreement, so as to enable it to undertake construction. The prayer is for delivery of possession of the suit property of 425 sq. yards, so as to enable it to proceed with the development of the property, or in the alternative, to direct the respondents herein to pay a sum of Rs. 4,80,000/-, with interest. While the petitioner pleads that it is a suit for specific performance simpliciter, the respondents insisted that the relief is for delivery of immovable property. If the contention of the petitioner is to be accepted, the relevant provision for payment of court-fee is Section 39 of the Act, that applies to suits for specific performance. Se

Click Here to Read the rest of this document