( 1 ) THIS second appeal arises out of a decree passed by the Court of Principal Junior Civil Judge, Ongole, in o. S. No. 79 of 1991, which in turn, was confirmed by the Court of IV Additional district Judge (Fast Track Court), in a. S. No. 68 of 1999. The 2nd defendant in the suit is the appellant.

( 2 ) THE relevant facts are as under: the 3rd respondent was the owner of the suit schedule house in an area of 1440 Sq. feet. He sold it through a sale deed dated 29-8-1963 (Ex. A-8), to the 2nd respondent. The appellant purchased the said property under two separate sale deeds, dated 24-9-1964 (Ex. P-1) and 10-12-1991 (Ex. B-2) from the 2nd respondent. He claims to have added some more constructions on the site in the year 1972. The 3rd respondent filed O. S. No. 247 of 1972 in the Court of district Munsif, Ongole, for recovery of balance of consideration under Ex. A. 8, from the 2nd respondent. Since the property was purchased by the appellant herein, in the meanwhile, he too was impleaded as defendant No. 2 in that suit. The suit was decreed ex parte on 17-7-1972. The suit schedule property was attached and thereafter, brought to sale, on 14-6-1983. The 1st respondent emerged as the successful bidder. The sale in his favour was confirmed on 16-8-1983 and the sale certificate, Ex. A-1, was issued on the same day.

( 3 ) THE 1st respondent filed the present suit, i. e. O. S. No. 79 of 1991 on 25-9-1991, for declaration of title and for recovery of possession of the property and for mandatory injunction, for removal of certain new constructions, said to have been brought about by the appellant and the 2nd respondent. The 1st respondent narrated the manner in which, he acquired the property, and tried to explain the delay, in initiating steps to recover possession of the land. The suit was resisted mainly by the appellant. The plea as to the very maintainability of the suit was raised. It was alleged that the suit is barred under section 47 of C. P. C. It was also urged that the only way, in which, the 1st respondent could have secured the possession if all, was by filing an application under Rule 95 of Order 21, and since the limitation therefor expired long back, the suit was not maintainable. Several subsidiary contentions were also urged. The Trial Court decreed the suit, and the decree was affirmed in the appeal.

( 4 ) SRI V. L. N. G. K. Murthy, learned counsel for the appellant submits that a separate suit by an auction-purchaser, in an execution sale, is not maintainable, and is barred under Section 47 of C. P. C. By placing reliance upon several judgments of the Supreme Court and High Courts, he submits that Order 21 C. P. C. , prescribes an exhaustive procedure for execution, commencing from attachment of the property, to delivery of possession to the auction- purchaser, and it is impermissible to file a separate suit for any relief that can be claimed under Order 21 C. P. C. He draws analogy from Rules 58 and 101 of order 21, which prohibit filing of separate suits for the corresponding remedies. His second contention is that the prayer for removal of construction is vague and a mandatory injunction cannot be granted on the strength of such pleadings.

( 5 ) SRI M. R. S. Srinivas, learned counsel for the 1st respondent submits that his client acquired title in the suit schedule property, on the basis of the sale certificate issued by the Executing Court, and it is always open to him to secure the possession of the property by filing a suit, or through other step permissible in law. Learned counsel conterids that though Rule 95 of order 21 is one of the remedies, it is not exclusive and exhaustive, nor does it bar the filing of a fresh suit. He submits that with the finalization of sale, the execution proceedings, almost assumed finality and hardly there would be an occasion for a judgment-debtor to raise any objection for delivery of possession. He further contends that the appellant is very much a party to the decree in O

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