( 1 ) HEARD Sri Balaji representing Sri Gudapati Venkateswara Rao, learned counsel representing the appellant, and Sri krishnaiah, learned counsel representing the respondent.

( 2 ) ON 1-2-2002, the second appeal was admitted by this court on the following substantial questions of law in ground nos. 9 (1)to (3): (1) Whether the lower appellate court can pass an order of eviction of the premises which described as thatched shed which comes under a. P. Building (Lease, Rent and eviction Control) Act, 1960 under section 2 (iii) by way of a regular suit? (2) Whether the civil court has jurisdiction under Section 9 of Code of Civil Procedure to entertain the suit, which was expressly barred by the A. P. Building (Lease, Rent and eviction Control) Act, 1960? (3) Whether ignoring the weight of evidence, proceedings on wrong or wrong premises of law or deriving such conclusions from the established facts as betray a lack of reasons and or objectivity would render the findings of the appellate court not according to law calling for interference under Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure?

( 3 ) ONE Sri Panga Illayya, defendant in p. S. No. 159 of 1992 on the file of Additional Junior Civil Judge, Srikakulam, aggrieved by the reversing judgment and decree made in A. S. No. 83 of 1998 on the file of the District Court, Srikakulam, which was renumbered as A. S. No. 35 of 2001 on the file of the Principal Senior Civil Judge, srikakulam, had preferred the present second appeal.

( 4 ) THE aforesaid suit was instituted by neethi Mahalakshmi wherein the respondent-plaintiff prayed for removal of structures on the suit site and to deliver vacant possession of the site with future profits and also for costs. The court of first instance dismissed the suit without costs on 28-4-1998 and the Principal Senior Civil judge, Srikakulam, allowed A. S. No. 35 of 2001 on 30-11 -2001. Aggrieved by the same the present second appeal has been filed.

( 5 ) THOUGH three questions referred to supra were shown as substantial questions of law, virtually the only question to be decided in the present second appeal is as hereunder: (1) Whether the Civil Court has jurisdiction to try the suit relating to the plaint schedule property in view of the provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and eviction) Control Act, 1960? both the counsel addressed elaborate arguments.

( 6 ) THE stand taken by the appellant is that the appellate court had totally erred in reversing the well considered judgment of the trial court especially in the light of the oral and documentary evidence. The learned counsel for the appellant also submitted that when originally the tenancy commenced in the year 1966, it is on the part of the respondent-plaintiff to prove the same and in the court of first instance the said document was not filed. But I. A. No. 15 of 2001 was filed before the appellate court and the appellate court, mainly on the strength of the recitals of ex. A-1 and also of Ex. A-5, had arrived at a conclusion that what was let out in the year 1966 by the landlady to the tenant was only a vacant site and not a super structure existing thereon. The learned counsel also would contend that this approach cannot be sustained especially in the light of Ex. B-1 wherein the structure had also been mentioned. Hence, it should be taken that what was let out was only a hut or a super structure along with the site and hence definitely Civil Court has no jurisdiction. The learned counsel also had taken this court through the evidence of P. Ws. 1 and 2 and also D. Ws. 1 and 2 in this regard.

( 7 ) PER contra Sri Krishnaiah, the learned counsel representing the respondent- plaintiff, had pointed out that P. W. 1 had clearly deposed on this aspect that the tenancy commenced in the year 1966 and no doubt the counsel in all fairness stated that this document produced at the appellate stage could have been produced even before the court of first instance. But, however, the