2004 Supreme(AP) 377
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : L.NARSIMHA REDDY
Korru Reddi Kumar - Appellant
Versus
M.Suresh Kumar Reddy - Respondent
CMSA.No23/03
Decided On : 03-26-04
Advocates Appeared :
Mr. K.G. Krishna Murthy, Mr. N. Pramod
Headnote:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE, Or21, R58 - Execution proceedings initiated since JDrs did not satisfy decree and attached landed property of one of JDrs - Claim petition filed basing on agreement of sale in respect of some items of EP Schedule
For raising claim, claimant should possess valid and substantial right in property which is sought to
be proceeded with, in execution - Admittedly, possession continued to be with JDr despite agreement - If no relief can be granted in suit on set of facts pleaded in claim petition, objection to execution proceedings cannot be sustained - Hence claimant cannot be permitted to stall execution proceedings - CMSA, dismissed
( 2 ) THE appellant contended that he entered into an agreement of sale with the fourth respondent on 05-08-1998 to purchase items 8 to 12 of the E. P. Schedule, for a consideration of Rs. 40,000/- and an amount of Rs. 35,000/- was already paid. On the strength of this agreement, he claimed that the said items of property cannot be proceeded with. The E. A. was resisted by the first respondent. Through its orders dated 23-04-2001, the executing Court dismissed the E. A. Aggrieved thereby, the appellant filed A. S. No. 31 of 2001 in the Court of the II Additional District Judge, Madanapalle. The appeal was dismissed through judgment dated 09-05-2001. Hence, this civil miscellaneous second appeal.
( 3 ) SRI K. G. Krishna Murthy, learned Counsel for the appellants submits that the appellant had acquired substantial right in the property in question on the strength of the agreement of sale and the Courts below ought to have accepted the claim of the appellant. He submits that the agreement of sale was anterior to the decree and that the same cannot be ignored. Sri. N. Pramod, learned counsel for the first respondent submits that the agreement itself is a sham transaction brought about, for the purpose of defeating the claim under the decree. He submits the fact that the agreement of sale was brought about, hardly one month before the date of the decree that too without any possessory rights discloses the purpose behind it. The first respondent filed a suit for recovery of amount against the respondents 2, 3 and 4 and the suit was decreed on 16-09-1998. Execution proceedings were initiated and certain properties belonging to the fourth respondent were attached. As regards items 8 to 12 of the schedule, the appellant came forward with a claim petition under Order XX1 Rule 58 C. P. C. Such an application required to be dealt with, as though it is an independent suit. An appeal is provided for against an order passed therein. It was for this reason that the executing Court permitted oral and documentary evidence to be adduced, and considered the matter extensively. P. Ws. 1 and 2 were examined on behalf of the appellant and the agreement of sale dated 05-08-1998 was marked as Ex. A1. The first respondent was examined as R. W. 1.
( 4 ) FOR raising a claim under Order XX1 Rule 58 or 99 C. P. C. , the claimant should possesses valid and substantial right in the property, which is sought to be attached or otherwise proceeded with, in execution. Claims, which are not recognized in law, cannot be permitted to be raised. The appellant contended that a right had accrued to him under agreement of sale dated 05-08-1998. The Courts below refused to recognize his rights on recording a finding that the agreement itself is a sham transaction brought about to defeat the claim under decree. Extensive discussion was undertaken for recording this finding. The fact that the appellant was none other than the co-brother (husband of wife sister) and that he failed to prove the factum of payment of the amount were specifically referred to.
( 5 ) EVEN assuming that the agreement is not genuine, it needs to be seen as to how far the claim of the appellant can be accepted to stall the execution proceedings. Admittedly, the possession continued to be with the fourth respondent despite the agreem