( 1 ) THESE two OPs. , are filed for setting aside the awards dated 10-8-1999 passed by the arbitrator Sri Justice T. N. C. Rangarajan, a former Judge of this Court. The parties are common to both these OPs. , the first respondent was awarded two contracts by the petitioners herein. (The details of which may not be necessary at this stage ). Suffice to state that with regard to both the contracts, the first respondent herein had earlier approached this Court for the appointment of an arbitrator by arbitration Application Nos. 11 and 8 of 1988 and this Court by a common order dated 13-3-1999 appointed the second respondent as an arbitrator in both the matters. Pursuant to the said orders of this court, the second respondent herein entered upon the arbitration and passed awards vide his letter dated TNCRJ/ac 26 dated 10-8-1999.

( 2 ) THESE two petitioners are filed with a prayer to set aside the above-referred award passed by the second respondent for various grounds indicated in the respective petitions.

( 3 ) AT the admission stage, a preliminary objection was raised by the first respondent saying that these two petitions purported to have been filed under Section 34 of the Arbitration and conciliation Act, 1996 are not maintainable, for the reason, that in view of the language of Section 34, an application for setting aside an award made by the arbitrator can be filed only in court and the expression court is defined under Section 2 (e) of the act in the following words:" court means the Principal Civil Court of original jurisdiction in a district, and includes the High Court in exercise of its ordinary original civil jurisdiction, having jurisdiction to decide the questions forming the subject-matter of the arbitration if the same had been the subject-matter of a suit, but does not include any Civil Court of a grade inferior to such Principal Civil Court, or any court of Small Causes"

( 4 ) IT is therefore submitted by the respondent that the petition such as the present one to set aside the award could be filed only in the Court of the Principal Civil court of original jurisdiction, which expression as per the definition, included the High Court in exercise of its ordinary civil jurisdiction to decide the questions, forming the subject-matter of arbitration, if the same had been the subject-matter of the suit. It is further argued that the High court of Andhra Pradesh not being a Court having ordinary original civil jurisdiction to deal with such as suit, the petitions are not maintainable.

( 5 ) ON the other hand, the learned counsel for the petitioners argued that in view of the provisions contained under section 42 of the Act, this Court being the court which appointed the arbitrator in both the cases, would only be the competent court to deal with the present petitions to set aside the awards passed by the arbitrator appointed by this Court. The learned counsel for the petitioners heavily relied upon a judgment of the Supreme Court reported in M/s. Guru Nanak Foundation v ms. Rattan Singh and Sons, AIR 1981 SC 2075, in support of his submission.

( 6 ) BEFORE proceeding with the revial contention, it would be appropriate to examine the decision referred to by the learned Counsel for the petitioner to decide whether the decision covers the issue on hand.

( 7 ) AT the outset, it must be mentioned the said decision was rendered on the construction of the language of Arbitration act, 1940. The brief background and the issue that arose for consideration of the supreme Court is as follows: There was contract between the parties for the construction of a building, which contained an arbitration clause. Certain disputes and differences arose between the parties to the contract. One of the parties moved the delhi High Court by way of a suit seeking a direction to call upon the other party to file the arbitration agreement in the Court and for a further direction to refer the disputes and the differences cov