( 1 ) THIS revision is filed against the order passed by the Assistant Sessions Judge, Nuzvid in Crl. MP No. 88 of 1996 in SC No. 179 of 1994 permitting the Public Prosecutor to withdraw the prosecution in SC No. 179 of 1994. While the SC was pending, the Public Prosecutor filed a petition under Section 321 Cr. PC proposing to withdraw the case. Thereupon the learned Assistant Sessions Judge passed the following order:"heard. Permitted. Destroy if any property after appeal time. "this order is challenged in this revision.

( 2 ) THE learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner submitted that the Public Prosecutor is the prime custodian to take a decision with regard to the withdrawal of the criminal case on the advise of the State. As per the Counsel the Public Prosecutor can take an independent decision and he should not be governed or directed by the executive authority. He also submitted that the Court cannot also act mechanically; it should apply its mind and take decision suitably whether public interest would be served by the act of withdrawal of the case by the Public Prosecutor. Such consideration has not been gone into in this case by the Public Prosecutor and also by the Court. The impugned order is cryptic and does not indicate that the Assistant Sessions Judge has applied his mind.

( 3 ) IN support of his contention and to bring home the scope of Section 321 the learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner relied on the judgment of the Supreme Court rendered in R. M. Tewari v. State (NCT of Delhi), AIR 1996 SC 2047. In this case the Supreme Court while considering the scope of Section 321 of Cr. PC held:it, is therefore, clear that the Designated Court was right in taking the view that withdrawal from prosecution is not to be permitted mechanically by the Court on an application for that purpose made by the Public Prosecutor. It is equally clear that the Public Prosecutor also has not to act mechanically in the discharge of his statutory function under Section 321 Cr. PC, on such a recommendation being made by the Review Committee; and that it is the duty of the Public Prosecutor to satisfy himself that it is a fit case for withdrawal from prosecution before he seeks the consent of the Court for that purpose. It appears that in these matters, the Public Prosecutor did not fully appreciate the requirements of Section 321 Cr. PC and made the applications for withdrawal from prosecution only on the basis of the recommendations of the Review Committee. It was necessary for the Public Prosecutor to satisfy himself in each case that the case is fit for withdrawal from prosecution in accordance with the settled principles indicated in the decisions of this Court and when to satisfy the Designated Court of the existence of a ground which permits withdrawal from prosecution under Section 321 Cr. PC. " It was further held that "if the recommendation of the Review Committee, based on the material present, is, that resort to provisions of the TADA Act is unwarranted for any reason which permits withdrawal from prosecution for those offences, a suitable application made under Section 321 Cr. PC on that ground has to be considered and decided by the Designated Court giving due weight to and opinion formed by the Public Prosecutor on the basis of the recommendation of the High Power Committee". For the same purpose he relied upon a judgment of this Court rendered in T. Venkat Ram Reddy, Editor, Deccan Chronicle v. D. Gopalakrishnam Raju, 1992 (2) An. WR 633. In this case the teamed Judge referred the principles laid down in Sheo Nandan Paswan v. State of Bihar. reported in AIR 1987 SC 877 (Para 3 ). The learned Judge summarised the legal position from the judgment as follows:"1. Under the Scheme of the Code prosecution of an Offender for a serious offence is primarily the responsibility of the Executive. 2. The withdrawal from the prosecution is an executive function of the Public Prosecutor. 3. The discretion to