UMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE, CJ.

( 1 ) THIS appeal is directed against the order of the learned single Judge admitting the Company Petition filed by the respondent - petitioner under section 433 of the Companies Act, 1956. The only defence raised before the learned single Judge is the plea of limitation. There cannot possibly be any doubt that the plea of limitation would be a substantial defence in an application for winding up provided/ however, it has its sustenance from the factual score.

( 2 ) ON the wake of the aforesaid, let us advert to the factual aspect of the matter briefly at this juncture: Admittedly, the respondent-Company had supplied C. I. castings, fan body, bottom covers etc. , to the appellant - company in the month of August, 1992 under two separate bills i. e. , for Rs. 98,268. 77 ps. and Rs. 1,32,939. 46 ps. , totalling Rs. 2,31,298. 23 ps. The petitioner before the learned single Judge did serve a legal notice on 03-08-1995 and thereafter a statutory notice under Section 434 of the Companies Act on 27-08-1996. The appellant - company, however, thought it prudent not to reply to any of the notices as above and by reason of which, the petitioner before the learned single Judge filed an application for winding up of the appellant - company under Section 433 of the Companies Act. Before the learned single Judge, it has been the specific contention of the appellant herein, being the respondent therein, that since the claim of the petitioning creditor, being the respondent herein, is barred by the laws of limitation, there is no existing debt and, therefore, the question of failure on the part of the appellant to pay the debt does not and cannot arise. While it is true that there ought to be a debt existing and a barred debt cannot be termed to be a debt existing, but the factual context shall have to be assessed so that the contention in regard thereto may be considered in its proper spirit. The records depict that as late as March, 1995 the appellant - company has furnished sales-tax declaration forms by way of C-form in respect of the self-same transaction to the petitioning creditor. This submission of C-form , in our view, is a significant element in itself inasmuch as the same admit of the existence of a jural relationship between the parties. In this context, the observations of the Supreme Court in the case of S. F. Mazda vs. Durga Prosad ought to be noted. The Supreme Court in no uncertain terms has observed that though a plea of acknowledgment ought to relate to a present subsisting liability but an exact nature or specific corrector of the said liability may not be indicated in words and in the event the words used indicate the existence of jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor and the statement is made with the intention to admit such jural relationship, question of the claim being barred does not arise. The Supreme Court went on to observe that the intention to admit jural relationship can also be inferred by implication from the nature of the admission and need not be expressed in words and if the statement is fairly clear, then, and, in that event intention to admit jural relationship may be implied from the same.

( 3 ) AS noted above, the appellant - company did furnish sales-tax declarationform regarding the self-same sale transaction between the parties. Does it not mean and imply that there has been an intention on the part of the appellant - company to admit the existence of a jural relationship between the parties such as that of debtor and creditor in regard to the debt in question in our view, the answer cannot but be in the affirmative. As such, the plea of limitation in the contextual facts, on the basis of the law laid down by the Supreme Court, as noted above, cannot be sustained.

( 4 ) THE learned Advocate appearing for the petitioning - creditor, however,also drew our attention to some of the documents annexed to the appeal viz. , statements of balan

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