UMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE, J.

( 1 ) SINCE the decision of the Privy Council in the oft-cited decision in Emperor v. Ncizir Ahmed, AIR 1945 PC 18, the law as regards the interference with the investigation by the police in matters which are within their province and domain stands well settled to the effect and in the words of Lord Porter, "no doubt, if no cognizable offence is disclosed and still more if no offence of any kind is disclosed the police would have no authority to undertake an investigation" and the converse situation, therefore, is that an investigation cannot be quashed if some cognizable offence is disclosed by the first information report. The observations of the Supreme Court in State of West Bengal v. Swapin Kumar Gniha, AIR 1982 SC 949 and in the case of State of Haryana v. Bhajtm lal, AIR 1992 SC 604 as also in the case of Union of India v. B. R. Bajaj, AIR 1994 SC 1256, lend concurrence to the view as above. The factum of exercise of revisional jurisdiction under Section 482 ofthe Code of Criminal Procedure or that of the provisions under Article 226 of the Constitution does not really make any difference to this well settled proposition that investigation can be quashed only in the event of non-disclosure of a cognizable offence in the first information report.

( 2 ) THE revisional jurisdiction as conferred on to the High Court in terms of provisions of Section 482 of the Code of Criminal Procedure may be exercised to give effect to an order under the Code; to prevent abuse of the process of the Court; to otherwise secure the ends of justice. It is undoubtedly true that no genera! principle of rule can be evolved to govern the exercise of this inherent jurisdiction of the Court as saved by the Cede and it will be a matter for determination in each individual case whether the circumstances obtaining in that case make it incumbent on the Court to exercise such power to acliieve the objects mentioned in the Section. The legislative intent for retention of !he inherent power of a Court is clear and categorical to the effect that the law Courts exist to subserve the ends of justice and in the event of justice of the situation demands any interference, (here ought not to be any hesitation in the matter of exercise of jurisdiction. But this exercise of jurisdiction is also restrictive and cannot be said to be available in any and every matter and it is for this purpose only judicial decisions lay a guiding principle that in the event of there being a complaint without disclosure of an offence, it would be a plain exercise of judicial power to quash the same- on the same breath the law Courts have also settled since die decision of Nazir Ahmed s case (supra) that the judiciary should not interfere with the police in matters which are within their province and into which the law imposes upon them the duty of enquiry.

( 3 ) THE principal issue involved in this petition is in regard to the effect of Section 22 (1) of the Sick Industrial Companies (Special Provisions) Act, 19s5onaproceeding initiated under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act. For convenience sake, Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act is set out herein below. Section 138 reads:"where any cheque drawn by a person on an account maintained by him with a banker for pa> Tncnt of any amount of money to another person from out of that account for the discharge, in whole or in part, of any debt or other liability, is returned by the bank unpaid, either because of the amount of money standing to the credit of that account is insufficient to honour the cheque or that it exceeds the amount arranged to be paid from tliat account by an agreement made with that bank, such person shall be deemed to have committed an offence and shall, without prejudice to any other provision of this Act. be punished with imprisonment for a term which may extend to one year, or with fine which may extend to twee the amount of the cheque, or with both: Provided that no

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