C. V. N. SASTRY, J.

( 1 ) HEARD the learned Counsel on both sides.

( 2 ) THE unsuccessful plaintiff in the suit is the appellant. During thependency of this appeal, the sole appellant-plaintiff died and his legal representatives are brought on record as appellants 2 and 3,

( 3 ) THE appeal arises out of a suit for partition of the plaint schedule propertyconsisting of two items i. e. , item No. 1 comprises an extent of 84 1/2 Sq. yards of site with a thatched house therein and item No. 2 comprises of 253 1/2 Sq. yards of site with a zinc sheet shed therein. It may be mentioned that both these items are part of a total extent of 338 Sq. yards of site. Defendants 2 to 6 are the sisters of the plaintiff. The first defendant is the husband of the second defendant. It is not in dispute that the total extent of 338 Sq. yards of site originally belonged to Gireyya, the paternal grandfather of the plaintiff who had four sons including the plaintiff s father China Raghavulu. In a partition between China Raghavulu and his three brothers effected prior to 1951, China Raghavulu got for his share 84 1/2 Sq. yards which is shown as item No. l of the plaint schedule property. China Raghavulu purchased the shares of his three brothers also subsequently. Item No. 2 of the plaint schedule represents the three shares of the brothers which were so purchased by China raghavulu. Thus China Raghavulu became the owner of the entire extent of 338 Sq. yards. China Raghavulu died intestate on 21-/-1975 leaving behind surviving the plaintiff who is his only son and defendants 2 to 6 who are the daughters. According to the plaintiff, the suit property is the joint family property of himself and his father and as such he is entitled to a half share in the same by birth and on the death of his father he became entitled to l/6th share in the half share held by his father. Thus, according to the plaintiff, he is entitled in all to a 7/12 share in the suit property.

( 4 ) DEFENDANTS 3 to 6 (sic. 5) did not contest the suit and they remainedex parte. Defendants 1 and 2 filed a written statement contending that the suit property is the self-acquired property of China Raghavulu and that China raghavulu sold the suit property to defendants 1 and 2 under a registered sale deed dated 19-6-1973 (the registration copy of which is marked as ex. A-1 (sic. A-2) in the case) for discharge of antecedent debts and the plaintiff is, therefore, not entitled to any rights in the suit property. A further plea is taken by them that the suit filed for partition without seeking the relief of cancellation of the sale deed dated 19-6-1973 is not maintainable and it is also barred by limitation. The 6th defendant filed a separate written statement supporting the case of the defendants 1 and 2. The plaintiff, however, sought to question the validity of the sale deed dated 19-6-1973 on the ground that the same was obtained by defendants 1 and 2 by exercising undue influence and fraud on China Raghavulu and that the same is not supported by consideration.

( 5 ) AFTER framing appropriate issues, the trial Court dismissed the suitholding that the suit property is neither joint family property nor joint property as claimed by the plaintiff, that the sale deed dated 19-6-1973 executed by china Raghavulu in favour of defendants 1 and 2 is perfectly valid and binding on the plaintiff and that he has no right to question the same. The lower Court also held that the suit is barred by limitation.

( 6 ) JN this appeal, the learned Counsel for the plaintiff-appellant sought toassail all the findings of the lower Court. The first question which arises for consideration is whether the suit property is the joint family property or the self-acquired property of China Raghavulu.

( 7 ) IT may be mentioned aiat the case of the plaintiff is that Item No. 1 isthe ancestral joint family property which fell to the share of China Raghavulu in the partition between him and his brothers and that Item No. 2 was ac

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