UMESH CHANDRA BANERJEE, J.

( 1 ) SINCE the decision of the Supreme Court in Syed Yokoob s case Syed Yakoob v. K. S. Radhakrishnan, AIR 1964 SC 477 the law as regards the jurisdiction of the High Court in the matter of issuance of a Writ of Certiorari is well settled and one need not dilate much on that score, excepting however recording that the jurisdiction as conferred under the Constitution is a supervisory one and the High Court exercising such jurisdiction is not entitled to act as an appellate Court. Appreciation of evidence cannot be had by the High Court and the High Court is, though, authorised to correct an error of law apparent on the face of the record, but an error effect, however grave it may appear to be, cannot be interfered with in exercise of powers under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is, however, to be noted that in regard to a finding of feet recorded by the Tribunal, a Writ of Certiorari can be issued, if it is shown that in recording the said finding the Tribunal had erroneously refused to admit admissible and material evidence or had erroneously admitted inadmissible evidence, which has influenced the impugned finding. Similarly, a finding of fact based on no evidence would be regarded as an error of law, which can be corrected by a Writ of Certiorari. Insufficiency or inadequacy of evidence cannot be said to be a ground for interference by the writ Court. In this context, reference can be made to the two decisions of the Patna High Court in the case of Management of Junkundar Colliery of Messrs B. Mondal and Co. , v. Sahadeo Thakur, 1974 Lab. I. C. 417 and Bihar Khadi Gram Udyog Samity, Muzaffarpur v. State of Bihar, 1977 Lab. I. C. 466 as also Calcutta High Court decision in the case of Tollygunge Club Ltd. v. Fifth Industrial Tribunal, 1985 (1) L. L. J. 258 ought to be noted. The Patna High Court, in no uncertain terms observed that even in the event of a wrong perusal of evidence by the Labour Court, the High Court exercising powers under Article 226 of the Constitution shall not be justified in weighing the evidence for itself as if it were sitting in an appeal against an order of the Labour Court. In the second noted decision of the Patna High Court it has been observed that even if the Court can reasonably arrive at a conclusion different from that of the Labour Court but that cannot clothe the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution with the power to interfere with the findings of the Labour Court, The Calcutta High Court also in the same view recorded that there should not be any interference unless, of course, the rinding of the Labour Court is such that no reasonable person could come to such a finding and on the ground of perversity the finding can be interfered with by the writ Court and for no others.

( 2 ) THIS obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities ought to be the guiding principle so as to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. The Supreme Court in the case of U. P. Financial Corporation v. Gem Cap (India) Pvt. Ltd, (1993) 2 SCC 299 in para 11 of the Report, observed : "the obligation to act fairly on the part of the administrative authorities was evolved to ensure the rule of law and to prevent failure of justice. This doctrine is complementary to the principles of natural justice which the quasi-judicial authorities are bound to observe. It is true that the distinction between a quasi-judicial and the administrative action has become thin, as pointed out by this Court as far back as 1970 in A. K. Kraipak v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 262 = AIR 1970 SC 150. Even to the extent of judicial scrutiny/ judicial review in the case of administrative action cannot be larger than in the case of quasi-judicial action. If the High Court cannot sit as an appellate authority over the decisions and orders of quasi-judicial authorities it follows equally that it cannot do so in the case of administrative authorities. In the matter of

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