( 1 ) THE question of maintainability of L. P. A. S. R. No. 59802 of 1995, purported to have been filed against the order of the learned single Judge in C. C. No. 86 of 1995 refusing to proceed for contempt against the respondents, has been raised by the Registry. Since specific provision has been made in Section 19 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (for short "the Act") prescribing for appeals in matters of orders or decisions relating to contempt, the objection is that Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would not enable preferring an appeal against the order of the learned single Judge refusing to punish for contempt.

( 2 ) MR. K. V. Satyanarayana, learned counsel appearing for the petitioner/appellant, while fairly bringing to our notice that the question has been decided against the petitioner by two Division Bench s decision of this Court in S. Sammaiah v. A. P. S. E. B. , 1994 (2) ALT 729 and T. Vasanatha Lakshmi v. Prl. Apswar School, 1992 (2) An WR 1, yet urges for taking a fresh look at the question since according to him those cases were decided in the context of criminal contempt but that the present case being one of civil contempt, the provisions of Clause 15 of the Letters Patent would be applicable. Mr. C. N. Babu, learned counsel for the respondents on the other hand submits the two earlier decisions of this Court to have been correctly rendered and as entirely covering the field and that there is no scope of any re-consideration of the question.

( 3 ) ELABORATING his submission, Mr. Satyanarayana has urged that the decision of the Supreme Court in D. N. Taneja v. Bhajan Lal, 1988 (3) SCJ 88 deciding that when the Court refuses to punish for contempt it does not exercise its jurisdiction or power to punish for contempt for which an appeal would not lie as Section 19 of the Act only provides for an appeal when the order or decision of the High Court is in the exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt, is only applicable to criminal contempt as the Supreme Court itself clarified in the judgment that the scope and ambit of the judgment is confined to such criminal contempt alone. He further submits that not only the case before the Supreme Court was one of a Criminal contempt, but also Baradakanta Mishra v. Justice Gatikrushna Mishra, 1975 (1) SCR 524 : 1975 Cri LJ 1, the case on which reliance was placed in the case was itself a case of criminal contempt. While conceding that an appeal does not lie in the matter of a criminal contempt where the Court discharges the rule, it is argued that so far as civil contempt is concerned, it is a matter of civil nature and hence an appeal would lie from the decision of a learned single Judge even if it is one in which cognizance of contempt is refused to he taken and award of punishment is declined. On these premises it is urged by him that as two Division Bench decisions of this Court did not consider the question in the light of difference between civil and criminal contempt and failed to notice that in Taneja s case supra the Supreme Court itself confined its decision to criminal contempt alone, it should be held that a Letters Patent Appeal in the matter of civil contempt, even though the learned single Judge refused to hold the respondents guilty for contempt, lies.

( 4 ) REPELLING the argument, Mr. Babu, learned counsel appearing for the respondents contends of there being no difference between civil and criminal contempt so far as provision of appeal is concerned and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent as not being available to be invoked to maintain an appeal.

( 5 ) SECTION 19 of the Act stipulates that an appeal shall lie as of right from any order or decision of High Court in exercise of its jurisdiction to punish for contempt. When the order is of the learned single Judge the appeal lies to a Bench of not less than two Judges of the Court and when the order is of a Bench, it lies to the Supreme Court. Even though the Taneja s case the Court observed that the

Click Here to Read the rest of this document