P. VENKATARAMA REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THIS revision petition is filed under Section 22 of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act by the tenant of a non-residential premises-mulgis bearing Nos. 5-3-492 and 493 situated at Topkhana Road, Osmangunj, hyderabad. The petitioner has been carrying on business of glass and plywood etc. in the said premises. The premises bearing No. 5-3-492 was taken on lease in the year 1979 under a rental deed. The monthly rent originally agreed upon was Rs. 250/- per mulgi and the same was increased to Rs. 350/- subsequently. Though the eviction petition was filed in the year 1986 on several grounds, the only ground on which the eviction petition was allowed is the ground mentioned in Section 10 (2) (v) of the Act. A tenant securing alternative building is the ground for eviction as per the said provision. Both the Courts below held that the petitioner-tenant secured alternative accommodation of more than one premises for the purpose of doing business and therefore, the petitioner is liable for eviction.

( 2 ) THE two buildings which are found to be in the nature of alternative accommodation secured by the tenant are: the mulgi bearing No. 5-3-496, topkhana road, and premises bearing No. 5-3-625 in the same locality consisting of ground floor plus two floors. The factum of securing another non-residential building bearing No. 3-5-806/2 situated at King Koti locality was also put against the petitioner. However, in the absence of plea taken by the Respondent in regard to this premises, I am not at all inclined to base my conclusion on this ground. Even in regard to building No. 5-3-625, I feel that on the basis of available evidence, it is not safe to order eviction on that ground. But, for the reasons stated hereinafter, I affirm the findings of the courts below with regard to securing alternative accommodation by taking on rent the mulgi bearing No. 5-2-496 (sic. 5-3-496) in the year 1983.

( 3 ) AS regards the building bearing No. 5-3-496, the argument advanced on behalf of the petitioner is that it is not an alternative accommodation, but, it is only in the nature of additional accommodation. The learned Counsel for the petitioner relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in S. Ramalakshmamma vs. M/s. Lakshmi General Stores to highlight the distinction between alternative and additional accommodation . It may be mentioned that the requirement of additional accommodation is a ground for eviction under Clause (c) of Section 10 (3) of the Act if the landlord is occupying a part of the building and the tenant is occupying the whole or any portion of the remaining building. As far as the building bearing No. 5-3-625 is concerned, the stand of the petitioner is that it does not belong to him as it fell to the share of his mother at the time of family partition effected in the year 1980.

( 4 ) THE learned Counsel for the respondent-landlord (sic. landlady) stressed on the fact that no plea was raised by the tenant as regards the premises no. 5-3-496 that it was taken on rent to provide additional accommodation to his existing business. The learned Counsel has drawn my attention to the discussion in the judgments of the Rent Controller and the appellate Court and submits that there is no illegality or irregularity in the impugned orders and they are based oft appreciation of entire evidence on record.

( 5 ) BEFORE proceeding further, I may refer to the observations of the Division bench in Ramalakshmamma s case (1 supra) as regards the cannotation of the term alternative accommodation in contra-distinction to additional accommodation . Their Lordships after referring to the phrase secured observed:"it follows therefore that whether the tenant has constructed his own building or has taken a building on rent in either case, it will mean that he has secured a building within the meaning of the said provision provided of course that such building satisfies the essential requiremen

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