SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QQADRI, J.

( 1 ) THESE three cases raise a common question; so they are heard together and are being disposed of by a common judgment.

( 2 ) THE petitioner in WP No. 198355 of 1995 is the petitioner in WP No. 25360 of 1997. The first named writ petition was disposed of by a learned single Judge on 28/07/1997. Assailing the validity of the said order, the second respondent-the Gorinta Primary Agrl. Co-operative Society, Gorinta, Peddapuram Mandalam, East Godavari District filed the writ appeal. The petitioner in WP No. 25333 of 1997 is also an employee of the appellant-society in WA No. 1289 of 1997. The proceedings which gave rise to these cases are the orders of suspension passed by the appellant-society against the employees pending enquiry. While allowing WP No. 19835 of 1995, the learned single Judge, by order referred to above, inter alia directed that the suspension orders be kept in abeyance and that the respondent-society would be at liberty to initiate departmental enquiry against the petitioners expeditiously and to complete the same in accordance with law. The learned single Judge directed three months time for completing the enquiry. It was also made clear that subsistence allowance be paid to the employees in accordance with the rules of the society.

( 3 ) IN WP Nos. 25360 and 25333 of 1997, the complaint is that the orders of suspension passed subsequent to the orders dated 28-7-1997 in WP No. 19835 of 1996 are in violation of the directives contained therein. Sri Satya Prasad, the learned Standing Counsel for the appellant-society and respondent in the other writ petitions, contends that against the Co-operative Society, no writ is maintainable, so the order of the learned single Judge has to be quashed. It is his further contention that after the order of termination is passed by the society, the writ petition had become infructuous, but the learned single Judge issued direction by the order under appeal, which is unsustainable in law.

( 4 ) SRI D. V. Bhadram, the learned Counsel for the petitioners in the writ petitions, contends that the employees are seeking enforcement of a statutory duty cast on the employer under Section 47 (6) of the A. P. Shops and Establishments Act, therefore, the writ is maintainable. He further contends that without complying with the orders of this Court, the subsequent suspension orders have been issued.

( 5 ) ON the above contentions, two questions arise for consideration; (1)whether the writ petition is maintainable against the appellant-society and (2) whether the directions issued by the learned single Judge are sustainable in law.

( 6 ) INSOFAR as the first point is concerned, it is squarely covered by the observations of a Full Bench of this Court of which one of us Syed Shah Mohammed Quadri, J was a member in Konaseema Cooperative Central Bank Ltd v. N. Seethamma Raju, AIR 1990 AP 171, wherein the Full Bench observed as under :"if a particular cooperative society can be characterised as a state within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution (applying the tests evolved by the Supreme Court in that behalf), it would also be an authority within the meaning, and for the purpose, of Article 226 of the Constitution. In such a situation, an order passed by a Society against its employee in violation of the bye-laws, can be corrected by way of a writ petition. This is not because the bye-laws have the force of law, but on the ground that having framed the bye-laws prescribing the service conditions of its employees, the Society must follow them, in the interest of fairness. If it is left to the sweet will and pleasure of the society either to follow or not to follow the bye-laws, it would be inherently arbitrary, and may very likely give nse to discriminatory treatment. A society, which is a state has to act in conformity with Article 14 and for that reason, it will be made to follow the bye-laws. Even if a Society cannot be characterised as a state

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