( 1 ) NEITHER the order of reference made by the learned single Judge, nor that made by the Division Bench gives any definite indication as to the specific question or questions referred to the Full Bench. The learned single Judge felt that:"there is a conflict in the Divisional Bench decisions of this Court in ramakistaiah vs. Yellappa (AIR 1959 A. P. 653) and P. Ramana Reddy vs. K. Rukminamma (1968 (1) An. W. R. 221) with regard to applicability of explanation (i) to Section 13 (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 in deciding whether a document is a promissory note within the definition of Section 4 of the Negotiable Instruments Act". The Divisional Bench also felt that there was a divergence of opinion as to the nature of the suit document, which required to be settled at rest by a Full Bench in view of its general importance. To quote the words of the Division Bench:"as stated supra, there are conflicting views expressed in the two earlier judgments i. e. , Ramakistiah s case (1st supra) and State Bank s case (2nd supra) and the later judgment in Ramana Reddi s case (3rd supra ). As the interpretation as to whether the document in question is a promissory note or not is a very important question of law occurring day-in and day-out that arises in civil matters, we feel that it is just and proper to refer the matter to a Full Bench so as to resolve this conflict. Moreover, as the revision petition arises out of an order in the pending suit, there is any amount of urgency for being posted before a Full Bench. "the suit document itself was not the subject matter of consideration in any of the cases referred to in the two orders of reference and there is no conflict of opinion as to the nature of this particular document, though there is a dispute between the parties about its nature. Under these circumstances, we for rnulate the following questions for the Full Bench on the basis of what we understand to be the difficulty in the present case: (1) Whether the Court can or cannot look into the provisions of explanation (i) to Section 13 (1) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 for the purpose of deciding the nature of any document as a bond or as a Promissory Note? (2) Whether the suit document is a Promissory Note? If not, what is its nature?

( 2 ) AS to the first question, we may remind ourselves of the fact that the Indian stamp Act, 1899, (in short, the "stamp Act"), levies stamp duty on various documents at varying rates and, therefore, it becomes necessary first to determine the nature of any document before deciding the question of proper stamp duty payable on such document. Accordingly the definition of a bond or a promissory note as given in the Stamp Act alone is material for the purpose of determination of the nature of any document. Section 2 (22) of the Stamp Act defines promissory note as follows:"promissory note" means a promissory note as defined by the Negotiable instruments Act, 1881; "it also includes a note promissing the payment of any sum of money out of any particular fund which may or may not be available, or upon any condition or contingency which may or may not be performed or happen. " in the context of this definition of "promissory note" given in Section 2 (22) of the Stamp Act, the definition of the term as given in Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 assumes importance. Section 4 of the latter act defines "promissory note" as follows: "a promissory note is an instrument in writing (not being a bank-note or a currency-note) containing an unconditional undertaking, signed by the maker, to pay a certain sum of money only to, or to the order of, a certain person, or to the bearer of the instrument. Illustrations a signs instruments in the following terms: (a) "i promise to pay B or order Rs. 500. " (b) "i acknowledge myself to be indebted to B in Rs. 1,000, to be paid on demand, for value received. " (c) "mr. B, I. O. U. Rs. 1,000". (d) "i promise to pay B Rs. 500, and a