The requirement of submitting a certificate of deposit of compensation with the memorandum of appeal under Section 30 of the Workmen's Compensation Act, 1923, is mandatory, and non-compliance with this requirement renders the appeal incompetent.

S. PARVATHA RAO, J.

( 1 ) THE Letters patent Appeal is preferred questioning the order of the learned single Judge dated l3-3-1992 in C. M. P. Nos. 4553 and 6078 of 1991 making absolute the interim stay granted on 2-4-1991 in C. M. P. No. 4553 of 1991 in C. M. A. No. 464 of 1991 with certain modifications by directing the appellant in the C. M. A to deposit 50% of the compensation before the competent authority i. e. , the Commissioner of Workmen s compensation, within two weeks and making it clear that in the event of appellant failing to deposit the said amount, the interim stay would stand vacated and also that on such deposit being made, the workman, i. e. , the second respondent in the C. M. A. , would be at liberty to withdraw the same without furmshing security. From this it is obvious that C. M. A. No. 464 of 1991 has been preferred by the employer without complying with the requirements of the third proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the Workmen s Compensation Act, 1923 ( the act for short) which requires as follows:"provided further that no appeal by an employer under clause (a) shall lie unless the memorandum of appeal is accompained by a certificate by the Commissioner to the effect that the appellant has deposited with him the amount payable under the order appealed against. "the said proviso is inemphatic negative language - "no appeal. . . . shall lie unless. . . ". There can be no doubt that the requirement that the memorandum of appeal should be accompained by a certificate specified therein is a mandatory requirement and, in view of the emphatic negative language of the proviso, an appeal by an employer under the said clause (a) by presenting a memorandum of appeal unaccompanied by such a certificate will be incompetent. In Ohene Moore v. Akesseh tayee (1) AIR 1935 Privy Council 5, the judicial Committee of the Privy Council was considering the effect of the provision which required that leave to appeal from. . . . . Tribunal shall not be granted unless and until the appellant shall either have paid the cost in such Tribunal or shall have deposited therein or in the Court to which the appeal is being taken a sum of money sufficient to satisfy such costs". The privy Council found that the statutory condition upon which alone leave to appeal could be given was not fulfilled. The question arose whether that requirement could be treated as a mere technicality. Answering the said question in the negative, Lord Allan, speaking for the judicial Committee, observed as follows:"after all, it is to be remembered that all appeals in this country and elsewhere exist merely by statute and unless the statutory conditions are fulfilled no jurisdiction is given to any Court of Justice to entertain them. . . . . . . It is quite true that their lordships,as every other court, attempt to do substantial justice and to void technicalities; but their Lordships, like any other Court, are bound by the statute law, and if the statute law says there shall be no jurisdiction in a certain event, and that event has occurred, then it is impossible for their lordships or for any other Court to have jurisdiction. "in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Filmistan ltd (2) AIR 1961 Supreme Court 1134, the supreme Court considered the effect of the proviso to sub-section (1) of Section 30 of the income-tax Act, 1922, which was as follows:"provided that no appeal shall lie against an order under sub-section (1) of Section 46 unless the tax has been paid. "in that case a memorandum of appeal was filed and subsequently tax was paid, but within the time allowed for preferring the appeal. The contention raised before the Supreme Court was that the words no appeal shall lie meant that there was no right of appeal till the tax was paid and therefore if the tax had not been paid, the memorandum of appeal could not be filed and if filed it was merely a waste paper. Rejecting that contention the Supreme Court held as follows:"in our opinion the m

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