1996 Supreme(AP) 457
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Mohd Abdul Basith - Appellant
Versus
Razia Begum - Respondent
C.R.P.No.534/96 etc.
Decided On : 06-14-96
Advocates Appeared :
Mr. B. Sudhakar Reddy,Mr. Satish Ali Yavar
Headnote:CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE Sec 2(2) & 115, Or 7, R11 and Or 43 R 3 - Rejection of plaint on whatever ground is a decree within the meaning of Sec 2(2) of CPC - No revision is entertainable where an appeal lies - Hence the Order is appealable
( 1 ) THIS order shall also govern the disposal of CRP 591 of 1996. Both these revision petitions are being disposed of at the admission stage.
( 2 ) THE facts are as follows:
( 3 ) THE petitioner in OS SR 733/1996 brought a suit for specific performance of the contract on the strength of the agreement of sale dated 5-2-1980 alleging that the respondent had agreed to sell his share in the joint property after partition. On 17-2-1983, a memorandum of partition was prepared and the petitioner was put in possession of the land which had fallen against the share of the respondent. It was agreed that the respondent shall execute and get the sale deed registered on demand by the petitioner who had already paid the entire consideration to the respondent.
( 4 ) SIMILARLY, the plaintiff in OS SR 728/96 filed a suit for specific performance of the contract making almost similar allegations which had been made in the aforementioned suit OS SR 733/1996.
( 5 ) THE lower Court distinguishing the case of Kalikiri Ramanujulamma vs. Katakam Ramaiah Chetty and others held that as per the condition in agreement, sale deed was to be executed after partition. The partition was effected on 17-2-1983 and the petitioner was put in possession of the subject of dispute and because the date was fixed for specific performance of the contract and the sale deed was not executed, it amounted to refusal and as such the suit filed in 1996 has become barred by limitation and, therefore, rejected the plaint.
( 6 ) SIMILAR order had been passed in the other OS SR 728/96 also.
( 7 ) FEELING aggrieved by the impugned orders, the plaintiff of each case has preferred the aforementioned revisions.
( 8 ) SRI B. Basith Ali Yavar, learned counsel of the respondent in both the revisions raised a preliminary objection that the revision is not maintainable because the impugned order has been passed under Order 7 Rule ll (d) of the code of Civil Procedure which order amounts to a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the impugned order is a final order against which an appeallies and hence the revision should be dismissed as not maintainable.
( 9 ) SRI B. Sudhakar Reddy, learned counsel of the petitioner relying on Smt. Chamarin vs. Mst. Budhiyarin has urged that the impugned Order has not been passed on the plaint averments, but has been passed without noticing the defendant and as such it cannot be said that it is an order passed under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and, therefore, the impugned order is not a decree within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil Procedure. Relying on Mamuda Khateen vs. Beniyan Bib and others, it has been further submitted on Lehalf of the petitioner that similarly as an order rejecting the memorandum of appeal following rejection of an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act for condonation of the delay in filing the appeal is not a decree but an incidental order against which an application in revision under section 115 of the Code of Civil Procedure may lie but no appeal under order 43 Rule 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure can be preferred, against an order of rejection of the plaint not under Order 7 Rule 11 (d) no appeal lies and the revision is maintainable. On the law laid down in Kalakota Varalakshmi vs. Kalakota Veerareddi it has been further urged that prerequisite of a decree is that the proceedings which result in adjudication should start in a suit. The adjudication under Sections 9, 10,11 and 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act are regarded as decrees only for the purpose of those sections and they cannot be treated as decrees within the meaning of Section 2 (2) of the Code of Civil procedure. The learned lower Court without noticing the respondent erroneously reached the conclusion that the suit is barred by limitation ignoring the plaint allegations and, therefore, it is not an order under Order 7 Rule 11 of the Code of Civil