( 1 ) A very short question is to be decided in this appeal whether the original Defendant No. 2 could be held liable for payment of the decretal dues on the ground that he was an undisclosed partner of the Defendant No. 1-firm.

( 2 ) THE appellant is the original plaintiff and the respondents are the original defendants. The Trial Court passed a decree for Rs. 40,351 -26 ps. against Defendant Nos. 1 and 5 to 6, but not against Defendant Nos. 2 to 7. As far as Defendant No. 7 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant fairly conceded that there was no evidence against him that he was a partner of the Defendant no. 1, and therefore, he did not press for any decree against him. As far as Defendant No. 2 is concerned, the learned Counsel for the appellant did not dispute the fact that defendant No. 1-firm was a registered partnership firm, and that the name of defendant No. 2 was not shown as one of the partners in the Registration Certificate. However, according to him, he was still liable because he held out to be a partner of the defendant No. 1-firm, and therefore, he could be treated as an undisclosed partner and should be saddled with the liability of a partner. The judgment and decree of the Trial court is challenged in appeal by the present appellant before this Court.

( 3 ) SECTION 28 of the Partnership Act, 1932 lays down as under : 1. Any one who by words spoken or written or by conduct represents himself, or knowingly permits himself to be represented, to be a partner in a firm, is liable as a partner in that firm to any one who has on the faith of any such representation given credit to the firm, whether the person representing himself or represented to be a partner does or does not know that the representation has reached the person so giving credit. 2. xxxxxxxxxx

( 4 ) THIS section makes a person liable on the basis of his representing himself as a partner in the firm. The section is based on the principle that it would be inequitable and unjust to a person, if another, by a representation induces him to act as he would not otherwise have done, were allowed to deny or repudiate the effect of his former statement to loss or injury to the person who acts upon it, and therefore, in order to make a person liable under this Section, on the principle of holding out,the following must be proved. (a) That such person has by words spoken or written or by conduct represented himself, or knowingly permitted himself to be represented, to be a partner in a firm; and (b) as such other person on the faith of such representation gave credit to the firm, whether the person representing himself or represented to be a partner does or does not know that a representation has been communicated to the person so giving credit.

( 5 ) ANOTHER essential condition is that the third person, on the faith of any such representation must have given credit to the firm, i. e. , the representation or the use of the name of the person holding himself out, or held out as a partner in a firm, must have come to the knowledge of the person who seeks to make them liable; otherwise there is no debt towards that person.

( 6 ) THE doctrine that person holding himself out as a partner and inducing others to act on the faith of his representation is liable to them as if he were in fact a partner, is nothing more than an illustration of the general principle of estoppel by conduct the defendant would be bound by indirect representation to the plaintiff arising from his conduct, as much as if he had stated to him directly and in express terms that he was a partner and the plaintiff had acted upon that statement, a person who knew nothing of the representation and entered into a transaction with a firm cannot be permitted to take advantage of any such representation of which he may subsequently have come to know. It is not necessary that the representation must have been made directly to the person giving credit to the firm on the faith of