C. V. N. SASTRY, J.

( 1 ) IN this writ petition, the petitioner seeks to assail the order dated 2-1 -1996 passed by the first respondentv i. e. , the Joint Transport Commissioner and secretary, State Transport Authority, A. P. , hyderabad, refusing to convene a timings conference to adjust the timings of the petitioner and the second respondent and referring the petitioner to the secretary, Transport Authority, Madras for the purpose.

( 2 ) THE petitioner operates two vehicles on the basis of pucca permits granted by the state Transport Authority, A. P. , on the inter- state route Pernambat to Kuppam via V. Kota. Subsequently the second respondent was granted temporary permits by the secretary, S. T. A. , Madras, one on the route vellore to Kuppam via V. Kota and gudiyatham and the other on Gudiyatham to kuppam via V. Kota. As the major part of the said routes lies in the State of Andhra pradesh, the permits obtained by the second respondent were counter-signed by the state Transport Authority of A. P. under section 88 of the Motor Vehicles Act. As there was a clash between the timings of the petitioner and the second respondent, the petitioner approached the first respondent with a representation dated 14-12-1995 to hold a timings conference for adjusting the timings of the petitioner and the second respondent. By the impugned memo dated 2-1-1996, the first respondent directed the petitioner to represent the matter before the secretary, State Transport Authority, madras, who granted the temporary permits to the second respondent, to hold the tim ings conference to settle the dispute regarding the timings. Aggrieved thereby, the petitioner has filed this writ petition.

( 3 ) SRI Noushad Ali, the learned counsel appearing for the petitioner, has contended that the first respondent, who is countersigning authority, is vested with all the powers of the permit granting authority under Section 88 (3) and (4) of the Motor vehicles Act and that the first respondent, by refusing to hold the timings conference, has abdicated his functions and failed 1 exercise the powers vested in him by law he further contends that the first responden t has a duty to consider the representation made by the petitioner on merits and that he cannotsimply direct the petitionerto approach the State Transport Authority at Madras without applying his mind. In support of his contentions, Mr. Noushad All placed reliance on the judgment in Goverdhan Lai v. State of Bihar (1) AIR 1988 SC 1676 and the decision of the Mysore High Court in M. Akbar v. Mys. State (2) AIR 1969 my sore 242.

( 4 ) ON the other hand, Sri K. Mangachari, the learned counsel appearing forthe second respondent, has contended thatthe petitioner has no right or locus standi to question the timings ofthe second respondent, that under the provisions of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1988, there are no restrictions whatsoever on the grant of permits and that the existing operators have no right to object, that it is only public interest which is paramount. He has also contended that, in any case, it is the primary authority which granted the permits that is competentto adjust the timings and as such the impugned order is perfectly correct and there are no valid grounds whatsoever to interfere with the same. He has also contended that the petitioner has an alternative remedy by way of appeal or revision to the state Transport Appellate Tribunal which the petitioner failed to exhaust and the writ petition is, therefore, not maintainable. In support of his contentions, Sri Mangachari, has placed reliance on the Full Bench judgment in Secretary R. T. A. , Guntur v. E. Rama Rao (3) 1990 (3) ALT 272 = 1990 (2) APLJ 408 and the judgment in w. P. No. l6829of 1994 dated 27-9-1994.

( 5 ) THE learned Government Pleader for transport appearing for the first respondent has also urged the same contentions as are advanced by Sri Mangachari.

( 6 ) SUB-SECTION (3) of Section 88 of the motor Vehicles Act, 1988, no doubt,

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