A suit for eviction of a building that is exempted from the Rent Control Act under a government notification is maintainable in a civil court, and the subsequent demolition of the building does not affect the validity of the decree of eviction.

P. VENKATARAMA REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THIS second appeal arises out of a suit for eviction of the appellant (1st defendant) and for recovery of possession filed by respondents 1 and 2 herein and the original owner, who died.

( 2 ) THE suit - O. S. No. 385/81 (on the file of the Principal District Munsif s court, Addanki was filed by one Sri B. V. Raghavacharyulu. During the pendency of the suit, respondents 1 and 2 jointly purchased the suit building and hence they were impleaded as plaintiffs 2 and 3. Later, during the pendency of the appeal, the 1st plaintiff Sri Raghavacharyulu died.

( 3 ) THE plaintiffs sought for eviction on the ground that the defendant- appellant committed breach of the terms of the lease agreement Ex. A-2 dated 7-4-1979 and despite expiry of the lease period of eleven months and the issuance of notice to vacate, the appellant failed to vacate the premises. It was held by the Courts below that Ex. B-3 agreement set up by the appellant according to which the lease period was three years, was not a genuine document and Ex. A-2 was valid and binding on the appellant. The Courts below also found that the suit building was constructed during the year 1975-76 and it was not governed by the provisions of the A. P. Buildings (Lease, rent and Eviction) Control Act. In coming to that conclusion, the trial Court relied upon the exemption granted by G. O. Ms. No. 636 dated 29-12-1983 and the judgment of a Division Bench of this Court in R. K. Gupta vs. Sartaj Karan. The lower Appellate Court however relied upon the judgment of this Court reported in Smt. Yadamma vs. K. Mallesh wherein it was held that the suits filed for eviction before Section 32 (b) of the Rent Control Act was struck down, were maintainable in a Civil Court.

( 4 ) IN the second appeal filed by the unsuccessful defendant, notice before admission was ordered on 23-1-1995 and interim stay of eviction was granted. It appears that the suit building was demolished on the same day. While admitting the second appeal on 14-3-1995, the following substantial questions of law were framed: (1) Whether the decree of eviction passed in this case is null and void on the ground that the A. P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control act, 1960 applies in view of the judgment of the Supreme Court in AIR 1984 SC 121 striking down Sec. 32 (b)? (2) Whether the finding that the building was constructed in the year 1975 is supported by legally admissible evidence? (3) Whether any and what relief could be granted to the appellant in case he succeeds in the light of subsequent event of demolition of the building?

( 5 ) BEFORE I proceed to consider the more contentious issue viz. , the 1st question, it would be proper to answer the second question. On this aspect, both the Courts have relied upon Ex. A-l certificate issued by the Executive Officer, gram Panchayat that the building was constructed in the year 1975-76 and it was assessed to property tax for the first time in the year 1975-76. P. W. 3, a clerk of the Gram Panchayat was examined to identify Ex. A-1 and to confirm the contents thereof. As against this evidence, the defendant did not adduce any evidence worth mentioning to substantiate his case that the building was constructed prior to 1957. The trial Court rightly rejected the evidence of the 1st defendant as D. W. 1 that he saw the construction when he was six years old. The concurrent findings of fact on this aspect cannot be disturbed in the second appeal. It must therefore be held that the building was completed by March, 1976, if not a few months earlier.

( 6 ) NOW, the core question that has been argued with vehemence by the learned Counsel for the appellant remains to be considered. The learned counsel Sri Suresh Kumar contends that the civil suit was not maintainable and the Courts below had no jurisdiction to grant a decree in favour of the plaintiffs for recovery of possession. It is his contention that the suit premises is governed by the provisions of t

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