LINGARAJA RATH, J.

( 1 ) WHETHER an Advocate is eligible to appear before the Industrial Tribunal on behalf of a party in an Industrial dispute in his capacity as the Joint Honorary secretary of the Federation of Ahdhra Pradesh Chamber of Commerce and industry, and whether the federation is an Association of employers or is a federation of Associations of employers, are the questions arising for decision in this case.

( 2 ) APPEARANCE of the counsel, Sri C. V. Mohan Reddy having not been entertained by the Tribunal, the 1st respondent-Electricity Board had come before mis Court in Writ Petition No. 11101 of 1993 which was disposed of with the direction, while remanding the matter to the Tribunal, to ascertain after taking evidence as to the status of the Federation of A. P. Chamber of Commerce and Industry as an Association of employers or a Federation of Associations of employers and as to the nature of the office held by Sri C. V. Mohan Reddy. The tribunal after taking evidence came to the conclusion of Mr. Reddy being not an Officer of the Federation, and the Federation itself being not a Federation of associations of employers and held Mr. Reddy as ineligible to appear to support the case for the 1st respondent. The matter having again come up before this Court in W. P. No. 20626 of 1993, the learned single Judge reversed the decision of the Tribunal and held Mr. Reddy as entitled to represent the cause of the 1st respondent The present appeal has been preferred against the decision.

( 3 ) MR, Mukunda Reddy, the party-in-person appearing for the appellants, has relied upon the decisions in HA. Ichaporiya vs. M. G. Hospital, Surat and another: Workmen vs. Darbar Ginning and Pressing Factory, Hubli and Paradip port Trust s. Their Workmen in support of both the contentions raised in this appeal. On the other hand, Mr. K. Srinivasa Murthy, learned Counsel appearing for the respwdents has placed reliance on the decision in P. Mallesha vs. Industriyal Disputes Tribunal, Hyderabad and Suryanarayana vs. Vijay Commercial bank both of which cases have been referred to in the judgment under appeal. It is the submission of Mr. Murthy that proper interpretation of Sections 36 (1) and 36 (2) of the Industrial Disputes Act would be to hold the words office bearer and an officer to convey the same meaning and that any one who is an office bearer in a company would be an officer for the purpose of the section and would be eligible to represent the management. According to him, the concept of a guaranteed payment or being subject to the control and direction of the management are not essential ingredients to be an officer .

( 4 ) THE concept of an officer was discussed in Suryanarayana s case and a passage in Buckley s Company Act was dted with approval. The passage observed lhat "a person who by the terms of his appointment is made and called ah officer, who is appointed by the company, paid by the company and whose function is to act on behalf of the company and whose appointment is made not on a special occasion for a special limited purpose, but under the regulations governing the constitution of the company is an officer". In the decision in paradip Port Trust Case (supra) their Lordships observed, analysing the provisions of Sections 36 (1) and 36 (2) of theact, that if a legal practitioner is appointed as an officer of a company or corporation and is in their pay and under their control and is not a practising advocate, the fact that he was earlier a legal p racti tioner or has a legal degree will not stand in the way of the company or the corporation being represented by him. Basing upon the observation, submission is advanced by Mr. Reddy that an integral part of the test for an "officer" is both the payment as well as the control aspect, and that further a practising advocate can never become an officer of a company. Mr. Murthy however places reliance on the observations made by the Court in the very decision in par

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