V. RAJAGOPALA REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THE Criminal Revision Case is filed questioning the order dated 9-7-1993 passed in Crl. R. P. No. 31 of 1992, by the III Additional Sessions Judge, Kurnool. The respondent filed Crl. M. P. No. 131 of 1991 in M. C. No. 83 of 1979, on the file of the Additional Judicial 1st Class Magistrate, Kurnool, under Section 127 Cr. P. C. (for short, `the Code ) for cancellation of the order of maintenance dated 1-8-1980 in M. C. No. 83 of 1979, on the sole ground that after the enactment of Muslim Women (Protection of Rights on Divorce) Act 1986 (for short, `the Act ) a divorced woman is no more entitled to claim maintenance beyond iddat period. The learned Magistrate allowed the petition by an order dated 8-5-1992. Aggrieved by the said order, the respondent filed Crl. R. P. No. 31 of 1992. The III Additional Sessions Judge, Karnool, allowed the Crl. R. P. and set aside the order passed by the Magistrate on the ground that the Act is only prospective in operation and does not affect the orders of maintenance already passed under Ss. 125 to 128 of the Code, granting maintenance to divorced woman and on the ground that the decision in Usman Khan Bhamani v. Fathimunnisa Begum, AIR 1990 Andh Pra 225 : (1990 Cri LJ 1364) (FB), did not consider the question of retrospectivity of the Act. Learned counsel for the petitioner forcefully contends before me that after the enactment of the Act, a divorced Muslim woman is not entitled for maintenance from the former husband beyond the period of iddat. He argues that the decision of this Court in Usman Khan Bahamani v. Fathimunnisa Begum, AIR 1990 Andh Pra 225 : (1990 Cri LJ 1364) (FB), has considered all aspects of and elucidated the scope and ambit of the Act and categorically held that the right of the divorced Muslim woman to obtain maintenance is obliterated except for the period of Iddat, under Section 125 of the Code, after the advent of the Act.

( 2 ) THE respondent is not present, though she was served. She is also not represented by an advocate.

( 3 ) THE short question that falls for consideration is whether the petitioner can still be held liable to pay the maintenance granted to the respondent under Section 127 of the Code in view of the Act.

( 4 ) I am of the view that the Full Bench Decision of this Court, referred to above, squarely covers the point raised in this case. In view of the ratio of that decision, the Crl. R. C. has to be allowed. The Full Bench, in the case referred to above, observed, (1990 Cri LJ 1364, paras 14, 15 and 23) (Andh Pra)"the very concept of liability of the husband is limited for and during the period of Iddat. The liability, if any, arising for payment of maintenance after the Iddat period to the divorced woman if she is unable to maintain herself is cast upon the relatives or the Wakf Board, under Section 4 of the Act. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . A combined and harmonious reading of the provisions of Sections 3 to 7 of the Act of 1986 would clearly demonstrate that the general object of the legislation is to bring the law of maintenance payable to the wife in consonance with the principles of Muslim law. Therefore, the provisions of Sections 125 to 128 of the Code will have no application to the Act of 1986 except in case of option exercised by the parties under Section 5 of the Act to any such claim of maintenance made by the wife under Section 125 of the Code. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . Therefore, in view of the foregoing, it is held that a divorced Muslim woman cannot claim maintenance under Section 125 of the Code from her former husband after passing of the Act of 1986. "learned Judges of the Full Bench considering the decision in Abid Ali v. Mrs. Raisa Begum, (1988) 1 Rajasthan LR 104, where a Muslim woman was divorced prior to coming into force of the Act, and in whose favour an order of maintenance has been passed and has become final, observed (Para 18 of 1990 Cri LJ 1364) (AP) :". . . . . if such an order is

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