J. ESWARA PRASAD, J.

( 1 ) THE husband of the respondent filed OP No. 30/ 86 for dissolution of his marriage with the respondent under S. 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act 1955 ( the Act , for short ). The petition was decreed ex parte on 11-7-1988. The petitioner (respondent?) filed IA No. 870/ 88 to set aside the ex parte decree. Subsequently, the husband of the respondent died on 11-2-1989, leaving behind his mother, the petitioner herein, as the only heir. The respondent filed IA No. 712/89 under O. 22, R. 4 (c) and S. 151, C. P. C. to implead the petitioner as the legal representative of the deceased in IA No. 870/ 88. The learned Judge allowed the application, giving rise to this revision.

( 2 ) SRI Y. K. Rayudu, learned counsel for the petitioner firstly contended that proceedings under S. 13 of the Act are personal in nature and they stand abated with the death of one of the spouses and no legal representatives of the deceased can be impleaded for continuing the proceedings. He further submitted that O. 22, R. 4, C. P. C. is not applicable to the proceedings under the Act.

( 3 ) SRI Adinarayanarao, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that the proceedings under S. 13 of the Act not only involve the personal status of the spouses, but also the marital status of the surviving party, including the right to inherent the property of the deceased and hence, the legal representative of the deceased can be brought on record and the proceedings can be continued. He further contended that the judgment rendered under S. 13 of the Act is a judgment in rem and not a judgment in personem and the provisions of the Civil Procedure Code, including O. 22, R, 4, are applicable to the proceedings under the Act.

( 4 ) IN view of the rival contentions of the parties, the question for consideration is, whether the provisions of O. 22, R. 4, C. P. C. are applicable to the proceedings under S. 13 of the Act?

( 5 ) SRI Rayudu relying on V. Sunanda v. V. Venkata Subbarao, AIR 1957 AP 424, argued that even an appeal filed against a decree for divorce would abate on the death of one of the parties and therefore, the entire proceedings, including the application for setting aside an ex parte decree, would abate. The learned Judges were dealing with abatement of the appeal against the decree dissolving the marriage where the respondent died and a question arose whether the appeal alone abated, leaving the decree intact, or whether the petition itself abated with the result that the decree also was vacated. It was held therein that the decree dissolving the marriage determines the status of the parties and is equivalent to a judgment in rem and will not stand automatically vacated on the abatement of the appeal. No proposition of law that the legal representatives of the deceased, respondent in appeal, cannot be brought on record in the appeal, is laid down, as contended by the learned counsel. On the other hand, the learned Judges clearly held that a decree for dissolution of marriage determines the status of the parties and is equivalent to a judgment in rem, meaning thereby that the decree is not a decree in personem, which merely determines the personal rights of the surviving party.

( 6 ) THE learned counsel next referred to Saraswathi Ammal v. Lakshmi, AIR 1989 Mad 216, wherein a learned single Judge of the Madras High Court held that an application filed for setting aside an ex parte decree for divorce, is not maintainable under O. 22, R. 4, C. P. C. , and that such a proceeding gives rise to a personal cause of action and does not survive on the death of the spouse. It was further held that the application for setting aside the ex parte decree abates. The learned Judge dissented with the judgment of the Karnataka High Court reported in Iravya v. Shivappa, AIR 1987 Kant 241, which took a contrary view. To the same effect is the view taken by the Calcutta High Court in Butter-field v. Butterfield, AIR 1923 Cal 426. With great respect to the le

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