JAGANNADHA RAO, J.

( 1 ) THIS appeal has been filed by the State (defendant in suit) under clause 15 of the Letters Patent against the order dated 16-7-1990 of the learned single Judge in C. M. P. No. 8300 of 1990 in the C. M. A. , refusing to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. The C. M. A. itself arises out of an order in 1 A No. 272/87 dated 9-12-1987 refusing to set aside an ex purte decree dated 19-2-1987 passed against the State by the learned Subordinate Judge, Karimnagar in O. S. No. 4/85 in a sum of rs. 1,60,001/ -. The amount, was claimed towards compensation payable for the alleged taking over of wells, said to be existing within certain property acquired under the Land Acquisition Act. So far as the maintainability of a Letters Patent Appeal against the order passed by the learned single Judge in appeals under Order 43, Rule 1, C. P. C. , there is no difficulty in view of the recent Full Bench judgment of this Court in Srinivas vs. J. N. T. University, explaining the decision of the Supt erne Court in Shah babulal Khimji vs. Jayaberi.

( 2 ) LEARNED Counsel for the respondent (plaintiff) Sri P. V. Narayaua rao, however, raised a preliminary objection that no Letters Patent appeal lies against an order refusing io condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act. On the other hand, it is contended by Mrs. Indra ram, for the Government Pleader that the Letters Patent Appeal is maintainable. It is further contended by her that the reasons for condonation fall within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court recently, in so far as appeals preferred by the State are concerned

( 3 ) ON the basis of the above contentions, two points arise for consideration : (1) Whether a Letters Patent Appeal lies at the instance of a defendant against an order passed by the learned single Judge refusing to condone the delay under Section 5 of the Limitation act in preferring an appeal ? and (2) Whether the reasons for condonation of delay as stated in the affidavit before the learned single Judge filed by the State fell within the parameters laid down by the Supreme Court recently in respect of appeals preferred by the State ?

( 4 ) POINT No. 1 : Under this point, the question is whether the order refusing to condone delay under Section 5 of the Limitation Act amounts to a judgment within the meaning of the said words in Clause 15 of the letters Patent (Madras), as applicable to this Court.

( 5 ) THE Supreme Court has recently considered this question elaborately in Shah Babulal Khimji s case (2) above referred to. It is necessary to analyse the judgment carefully.

( 6 ) THE Supreme Court first observed that the tests laid down by sir Richard Couch, C. J. in Justices of Peace, Calcutta vs. The Oriental Gas co. 3 were "every narrow" inasmuch as it was said there that the decision must have affected the merits of the question between the parties or must have determined some right or liability, though the order determining the right or liability, may be either final, preliminary or interlocutory. The supreme Court also referred to the views of White, C. J. in Tuljaram Row vs. Alagappa Chettiar and observed (see para 93) :". . . . . . . . . . WE are inclined to agree generally with these tests though we feel that some of the tests laid down are far too wide and may not be correct". The tests laid down by White, C J. are : It is not the form of adjudication which is to be seen, but its actual effect on the suit or proceeding; if, irrespective of the form of the suit or proceeding, the order impugned puts an end to the suit or proceeding, it doubtless amounts to a judgment; similarly, if the effect of the order, if not complied with, is to terminate the proceedings, the said order would amount to a judgment; any order in an independent proceeding, White, C. J. observed, even if it was ancillary to the suit (not being a step towards the judgment) but is designed to render the judgment effective, can also be termed as

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