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1991 Supreme(AP) 85

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : D.JAGANNADHA RAJU
Maqbal Bee - Appellant
Versus
APSRTC, General Manager, Musheeradad, Hyderabad - Respondent
C.M.A. No. 1663/90
Decided On : 03-05-91
Advocates Appeared :
Mr. K.G. Krishna Murthy

Headnote:MOTOR VEHICLES ACT, 1988, Sec. 166 (3) Proviso and Motor Vehicles Act, 1938, Sec. 110-A [2] - Claim petition filed after the 1988 Act relating to an accident occurred in 1982 - Tribunal cannot entertain petition.

       Held : Sub Sec. [3] of Sec. 166 of the New Act clearly contemplated that the application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the Occurrence of the accident. The proviso imposes a total embargo on the Claim Tribunal entertaining the application if such an application is filed. After a period of 12 months from the date of the accident. There is a vital statutory change in the law by reason of enactment of Sec. 166 (3). By reason of the amendment of the law the Tribunal is precluded from entertaining any application filed after a period of one year from the date of occurrence of the amendment.

       C.M.A. Dismissed

D. J. JAGANNADHA RAJU, J.

( 1 ) THIS Civil Miscellaneous Appeal has come up for admission. A few facts are pertnient for deciding whether this appeal can be entertained. The motor accident which gave rise to the claim for this M. V. O. P. which was regected by the tribunal occurred on 29-3-1982. The petition was filed before the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal, Chittoor on 18-8-89 indicating as if it is a petition filed under Section 110-A (3) of the Old Motor Vehicles act of 1939. A persual of the order passed by the District Judge-cum-Chairman of the Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal indicates that neither the Advocates who appeared in the matter nor the Judge were aware of the statutory changes that were effected by the passing of the Motor Vehicles act of 1988, (Act 58 of 1988) which came into force on 1-7-1989. Dealing with the petition as a petition under the old act, the Chairman Motor accidents Claims Tribunal came to the conclusion that the delay of 6 years, 10 months and 20 days in filing that O. P. cannot be condoned and there is no justification for condonation of the exhorbitant delay. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed. Against the order dt. 22-8-1990 passed by the tribunal dismissing the O. P. the present appeal is filed.

( 2 ) THE crucial question that arises for consideration is whether the appellants-petitioners are entitled to invoke the provisions of Section 110-A (3) of the old Act after passing of the new Motor Vehicles Act and whether an o. P. can be entertained in violation of Section 166 (3) of the new Act.

( 3 ) WHILE the Old Act Section 110-A (3) did not provide any limitation as regards the period of delay that can be condoned by the tribunal, the new motor Vehicles Act introduced Section 166 (3 ). Section 166 (3) reads as follows:" (3) No application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months, if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. "sub-section (3) clearly contemplates that no application for such compensation shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident. The proviso imposes a total embargo on the Claims Tribunal entertaining the application if such an application is filed, after a period of 12 months from the date of the accident. There is a vital statutory change in the law by reason of enactment of Section 106 (3) which is in the following words : "the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months but not later than twelve months. It is also interesting to see that what the applicant has to show under Section 166 (3) proviso is that the applicant was prevented from making the application in time. Sri Krishna Murthy appearing for the appellantspetitioners contends that notwithstanding the fact that the new Act came into force on 1-7-1989 his clients petition should be considered under the pre-existing law and not under the existing law. I am afraid such an argument cannot be countenanced. It is well settled principles of law and the law which governs an action is the law that is prevailing at the time of institution of the petition. Mr. Krishna Murthy further conterds that under the old act and under Section 110-A as it stood then, there are numerous decisions which had laid down that while construing the words "sufficient cause" a liberal interpretation should be given. I have absolutely no quarrel with the principle laid down by those decisions. It is significent to remember that under Sec. 110-A (3) there was no limitation for the total period of delay which could be condoned by the tribunal. But under the new Act there is a total embargo for entertaining any claim petition filed after one year from the date of occ






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