G. RADHAKRISHNA RAO, J.

( 1 ) THESE appeals are preferred by the State against the acquittal of the accused charged for offences committed by them under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act by various First Class Magistrates.

( 2 ) IN all these cases the Food Inspectors of their respective Municipalities had launched prosecution against the accused-respondents for certain offences committed under the provisions of the Prevention of Food Adulteration Act (for short the Act ). In all these cases, the trial Courts acquitted the accused on the ground that the sanctioning authority has not applied its mind for according sanction for launching prosecutions by following the provisions of S. 20 (1) of the Act. Hence the appeals by the State.

( 3 ) THE crucial point that arises for consideration in these appeals is whether the consent order has been issued by the competent authority after perusing the Public Analyst s report and the detailed report of the Health Officer of the respective Municipality for launching the prosecution.

( 4 ) IN this connection it is apposite to read S. 20 (1) of the Act which is as follows : "20. Cognizance and trial of offences : (1) No prosecution for an offence under this Act, not being an offence under S. 14 or S. 14-A shall be instituted except by or with the written consent of, the Central Govt. or the State Government or a person authorised in this behalf, by general or special order, by the Central Government or State Government. " The first part of S. 20 (1) of the Act lays down the manner of launching prosecutions for an offence under the Act not being an offence under S. 14 of S. 14-A. The second part provides for delegation of powers by the Central Government or the State Government. It enables that prosecutions for an offence under the Act can also be instituted with the written consent of the Central Government or the State Government or by a person authorised in that behalf, by a general or special order issued by the Central Government or the State Government. The use of the word "in this behalf" in S. 20 (1) of the Act shows that the delegation of such power by the Central Government or the State Government by general or special order must be for a specific purpose, to authorise a designated person to institute such prosecutions on their behalf. The terms of S. 20 (1) of the Act do not postulate further delegation by the person so authorised; he can only give his consent in writing when he is satisfied that a prima facie case exists in the facts of a particular case and record his reasons for the launching of such prosecution in public interest.

( 5 ) IN these cases according to the accused the Food Inspectors of the respective Municipalities have launched prosecutions without the written sanction from the competent authority which is mandatory under the provisions of S. 20 (1) of the Act. It is well settled that for launching prosecutions, written consent of the competent authority is mandatory under the provisions of S. 20 of the Act. The Courts below have followed a decision of this Court reported in Adda Kasivisweswara Rao v. State of A. P. , 1990 (3) ALT 220, and found that the mandatory provisions as laid down in S. 20 (1) of the Act in obtaining sanction for prosecution have not been followed and the order that has been passed by the sanctioning authority is not in proper form.

( 6 ) THE learned Public Prosecutor contends that the consent for launching prosecutions is a speaking order, that the sanctioning authority has applied its mind to the facts of the case for launching prosecutions before giving consent and therefore the orders of acquittal passed by the Courts below are unsustainable. In support of his contention he relied on a decision of the Supreme Court reported in State of Bihar v. P. P. Sharma, AIR 1991 SC 1260.

( 7 ) IT is useful to notice the consent order in one of cases i. e. Crl. A. No. 888/91 which reads as follows : "having considered the cas

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