SYED SHAH MOHAMMED QUADRI, J.

( 1 ) THE petitioner seeks a writ of habeas corpus directing the respondents to produce his son namely, Mohammed Bin Ahmed s/o Azam Ali before this court and consequently set him at liberty forthwith by declaring the detention order as illegal.

( 2 ) ON 27-9-1991 the Commissioner of Police, Hyderabad city, 2nd respondent herein, passed an order under sub-sec. (2) of S. 3 of Act 30/84 read with G. O. Rt. No. 1572 General Administration (Genl. A) Department dated 4-4-1991 directing that the detenu shall be detained under the said Act 30/84 and lodged in the Central Prison, Chanchalaguda, Hyderabad for a period of four weeks from the date of execution of the order. The grounds of the detention in support of the said order were supplied to him on 28-9-91. On 4-10-1991 the petitioner challenged the validity of the said order by filing a habeas corpus writ petition in W. P. No. 12979/91. On 9-10-1991 the Government of A. P. , first respondent herein, approved the order passed by the 2nd respondent. On 15-10-1991 the detenu was produced before the Advisory Board. On 22-10-1991 the first respondent issued G. O. Rt. No. 4892 confirming the order of detention. The earlier writ petition filed by the petitioner (W. P. No. 12979/91) was dismissed by this court on 24-10-1991. However, on 24-10-1991 the Government extended the period of detention for a period of six months from the date of detention i. e. 28-9-1991 by an order issued in G. O. Rt. No. 4945. The petitioner filed the present writ petition on 31-10-1991 challenging the validity of the order of detention passed by the 2nd respondent and confirmation of the same by the first respondent in the above G. O. Rt. No. 4892.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the petitioner submits that the grounds of detention do not disclose any offence u/s. 153-A, IPC; the satisfaction recorded by the 2nd respondent that the petitioner is a communal offender is wholly without application of mind and that the Act itself does not apply, therefore the detention order is liable to be quashed. He further submits that the 2nd respondent relied upon non-existing grounds in passing the order of detention against the petitioner. He also submits that at the time when the order of detention was extended, fresh grounds should exist and fresh satisfaction should be recorded, otherwise the extension order would be bad in law.

( 4 ) THE learned Advocate-General raised preliminary objection with regard to the maintainability of the writ petition. It is submitted that the writ petition is barred by principle of constructive res judicata, as the ground on which this W. P. is based, was not taken in the earlier writ petition. It is further submitted that the detenu was supplied with the memo of Asst. Commissioner of Police dated 24-8-1991 for addition of S. 153-A, IPC in the FIR, therefore the order of detention is legal and valid. The first respondent is competent to issue orders extending the period of detention from time to time and therefore, the order granting extension of the period of detention to six months cannot be validly assailed.

( 5 ) WE shall now take up the preliminary objection raised by the learned Advocate General as to whether the present writ petition is barred by the principle of constructive res judicata. The learned counsel for the petitioner relies on the judgment of the Supreme Court in Icchu Devi v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1983 and submits that strict rules of pleading cannot be applied in regard to the matters relating to writ of habeas corpus. In the said case the Supreme Court observed as follows (at page 1987 of Cri LJ) :- "in case of an application for a writ of habeas corpus, the practice evolved by Supreme Court is not to follow strict rules of pleading nor place undue emphasis on the question as to on whom the burden of proof lies. Even a post card written by a detenu from jail has been sufficient of activise the court into examining the legality of detenti

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