S. S. M. QUADRI, J.

( 1 ) IN this case, the court is called upon to examine the question of availability of judicial review of the administrative action of a public company, limited by shares and registered under the Companies Act, in awarding a contract.

( 2 ) AT the commencement of hearing of this case, Dr. Singhvi, learned counsel for the first respondent, raised a preliminary objection as to the maintainability of the writ petition. It would be appropriate to state briefly the factual context in which this question has arisen.

( 3 ) THE first respondent, a company registered under the Companies Act, issued a tender notice inviting tenders for freight, forwarding, port clearance, over dimensional consignments (for short,"odc") transportation and site handling. The petitioner, a partnership concern, and the second respondent, a private company registered under the Companies Act, are among the tenderers. The first respondent accepted the tender of the second respondent and awarded the contract to it. Complaining that the petitioner, in spite of being the lowest tenderer, was unjustly and arbitrarily excluded from consideration and discriminated against for awarding the contract in question, and the second respondent was favourably considered and awarded the contract, the petitioner sought a writ of mandamus declaring that the award of the contract by the first respondent in respect of the tender notice No. MPUR/wo/040 for freight forwarding the port clearance, ODC transportation and site handling to the second respondent as arbitrary, discriminatory and violative of article 14 of the Constitution, and for a further direction to award the said contract to the petitioner.

( 4 ) DR. Singhvi contends that the first respondent-company is a public limited company registered under the Companies Act and so it is not amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the High Court under article 226 of the Constitution. Sri. P. Ramachandra Reddy, learned counsel for the petitioner, on the other hand, contends that having regard to the observation of the Supreme Court in M. C. Mehta v. Union of India, AIR 1987 SC 1086 (hereinafter referred to as "shriram s case), the writ is maintainable against the first respondent.

( 5 ) AS the question relates to exercise of jurisdiction by the High Court for issuance of prerogative writs under article 226 (1) of the Constitution, it would be apposite to read it here : " 226. (1) Notwithstanding anything in article 32, every High Court shall have power, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction to issue to any person or authority, including in appropriate cases any Government, within those territories directions, orders or writs, including writs in the nature of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, or any of them, for the enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purpose. "

( 6 ) A plain reading of the article extracted above shows that it is couched in very wide language and empowers the High Court to issue directions, orders or writs including any of the prerogative writs of habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, throughout the territories in relation to which it exercises jurisdiction, for enforcement of any of the rights conferred by Part III and for any other purposes to any authority including in appropriate cases any Government.

( 7 ) IN S. K. C. C. Bank Limited v. N. Seetharama Raju, AIR 1990 AP 171 ; [1990] II ALT 1, a Full Bench of our High Court of which I am a member, observed in para 37 (at p. 189) : "similarly, it was pointed out in Dwarka v. ITO, AIR 1966 SC 81 that article 226 is couched in comprehensive phraseology and it ex facie confers a wide power on the High Court to reach injustice wherever it is found. A wide language in describing the nature of the power, the purpose for which and the person or authority against whom it can used, was designedly used by the Constitution. B

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