A. SEETARAM REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THE case of the revisionist herein is that the respondents had filed a civil suit during vacation before the Vacation Civil Judge, Kurnool, and obtained a temporary injunction. After vacation, the matter came up before the District Munsif, on the application made by the revisionist to vacate the injunction and the same was done by the District Munsif. Consequently an appeal was preferred to the learned Subordinate Judge, Adoni, who held that the District Munsif had no jurisdiction to vacate the injunction granted by the Vacation Civil Judge, Kurnool. The error is quite apparent. In asmuch as during the vacation it was certainly competent for the Vacation Civil judge to grant a temporary injunction for the vacation period which, he did, and later transmitted the record back to the court of competent jurisdiction namely the District Munsif, Adoni. Therefore, for all practical purposes, the order passed by the Vacation Civil Judgement be deemed to have been made by the District Munsif himself, which it could have done normally, but for the intervention of vacation. Hence it was certainly competent for the learned District Munsif to vacate the order of injunction grafted earlier by the Vacation Civil Judge. Since the aggrieved party has rightly preferred appeal, the learned subordinate Judge, ought to have either confirmed the injunction or vacated the same, and it is not certainly within his jurisdiction to say that the District Munsif lacked jurisdiction. Hence the order under revision is set aside.

( 2 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents relied on a decision of this court reported in V. Ramarao vs. K. Balakntaia wherein Ramaswamy J, was faced with a situation that arose out of sub-clauses (5) and (6) of Sec. 32 of the A. P. Civil Courts Act. Dealing with that aspect, it has been held by the learned Judge :"no doubt, a reading of sub-section (5) would manifest that after the re-opening of the courts concerned after summer vacation, order passed by the Vacation Civil Judge and the case shall stand transferred, to the court having jurisdiction and any judgment, decree, order or proceeding passed by the Vacation Civil Judge, deemed to be the judgment etc. , passed by the Court concerned. But the Legislature has taken care to see by introducing sub-section (6) that notwithstanding such deemed judgment, decree or order made under sub-section (5), when the appeal is provided under the law against such judgment, decree order passed by the Vacation Civil Judge, then appeal shall ie only to the High Court. The ambit of the entire , Section 32 is based on legal fiction. The object appears to be that during summer vacation, the litigant, in urgent cases instead of driving him/her to approach the High Court and avoid over-burden to the , High Court and to make avail of easy and inexpensive access to courts, enacted Section 32. On appointing a Vacation Judge, he should be conferred with jurisdiction. So the fictional deemed closure of the civil courts in the District is engrafted in sub-section (4) of section 32. In appointment of a Vacation Civil Judge, the power exercisable by the concerned presiding officer of the court stands transferred to the Vacation Civil Judge. As a result, by further fiction, of deemed provisions under sub-section (5) of Sec. 32, the judgment, the decree, or order passed by the Vacation Civil Judge was dedared to be to be deemed the judgment, decree or order passed by the court concerned. The legislature animation in engrafting sub-section (6) of section 32, appears to be that the order passed by the Vacation Civil judge shall not be dealt with by the Judicial Officer inferior to the vacation Civil Judge. It is already seen that under sub-section (1) of sec. 32 of the Act, the Vacation Civil Judge shall not be below the rank of a Subordinate Judge. Normally against the original judgment, decree, or order, the appeal shall lie ngainst the judgment etc. , of subordinate Judge or Distr

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