The jurisdiction of a court to try a suit is determined by the law in force at the time the suit is filed, and the subsequent striking down of a provision that confers or takes away jurisdiction does not affect the validity of proceedings already initiated.

( 1 ) THIS Second Appeal arises out of O. S. No. 150 of 1977 on the file of the Principal District Munsif, Punganur. That suit was filed by the respondent herein for ejectment of the appellant herein from the plaint schedule premises and for recovery of arrears of rent. Oral and documentary evidence was adduced on behalf of both the parties. On the basis of the evidence the suit was decreed. On appeal preferred by the appellant herein in the court of the Additional District Judge, Madanapalle, the learned District Judge reappraised the evidence and came to the same conclusion that the appellant herein was liable to be evicted from the suit schedule premises. Aggrieved by that judgment this Second Appeal was preferred.

( 2 ) IT is submitted by the learned counsel for the appellant: (1) thesuit Lled for ejectment was not maintainable in view of the striking down of clause (b) of Section 32 of the Andhra Pradesh Buildings, (Lease Rent and (Eviction) Control Act, 1960, (hereinafter referred to as the Rent Control act ) and (2) the notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property act was not in accordance with the provisions of that section and therefore the Judgment directing eviction of the appellant was not legal and valid.

( 3 ) THE suit was filed on April 14, 1977. Prior to the filing of the suit, the respondent filed a petition before the Rent Controller for eviction of the appellant herein. That petition was returned stating that the Rent controller had no jurisdiction to entertain the same as the building in respect of which the petition was filed was constructed after August 26, 1957. There is no dispute that the building was constructed after August 26, 1957. Therefore, the respondent filed the present suit. There is also no dispute that at the time of filing of the suit, the civil court had jurisdiction to entertain the suit. However, during the pendency of the suit, clause (b) of section 32 of the Rent Control Act was struck down by the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders vs. State of A. P. #1 The Civil court decreed the suit by its judgment dated September 24, 1984. So, the question that arises for consideration is whether the court which had jurisdiction at the time the suit was filed, was competent to try the suit after clause (b) of Section 32 was struck down.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant has placed strong reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Motor General Traders vs. State of a. P. (1 supra) in support of his contention that the civil court had no jurisdiction to try the suit for eviction of a tenant after clause (b) of section 32 of the Rent Control Act was struck down. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows: "we do realize the adverse effect of this decision on many who may have recently build houses by spending their life savings or by borrowing large funds during these inflationary days at high rates of interest, on the expectation and belief that they would not be subjected to the restrictions imposed by the Act. The incentive to built provides a rational basis for classification and it is necessary, in the national interest, that there should be freedom from restrictions for a limited period of time. It is always open to the State Legislature or the State Government to take action by amending the Act itself or under Section 26 of the Act, us the case may be, not only to provide incentive to persons who are desirous of building new houses, as it serves a definite social purpose but also to mitigate the rigour to such class of landlords who may have recently built their houses for a limited period as it has been done in the union Territory of Chandigarh as brought out in our recent judgment in M/s. Punjab Tin Supply Co. , Chandigarhy vs. Central Government (Writ Petns. Nos. 9935-41 9943-44 of 1982 etc. , decided, on Oct. 20, 1983: (Reported in AIR 1984. SC 87 ). The question whether new legislation should be initiated to exempt newly const