( 1 ) THEUNSUCCESSFUL defendants throughout are the appellants in this second appeal. The respondent filed the suit for decree for ejectment of the appellants and damages and for delivery of the possession thereof. The suit was decreed by the trial court and on appeal it was confirmed. Thus the second appeal. It is the case of the respondent-plaintiff that her husband died and she succeeded to the property. He inducted the appellants into possession as tenants. But the appellants did not pay the rents nor delivered the possession of the house. Accordingly she filed the suit for ejectment and also for damages. It is the case of the appellants that they were not the tenants with the respondent, that her step-son executed an agreement of sale and inducted them into possession. Pursuant thereof they have been continuing in possession. Admittedly the appellants filed O. S. No. 1207/74 on the file of the I Additional District Munsif for specific performance. The suit was dismissed and the decree became final. When the respondent has pleaded that the appellants are tenants they denied the jural relationship. Accordingly on those pleadings and on adduction of evidence the trial court decreed the suit. On appeal, as stated above, it was confirmed. The main contention raised by the appellants in the court below is that the notice required under Section 106 has not been issued. Therefore the suit is not maintainable, it was found by both the courts below that since they have denied the jural relationship of landlord and tenant the need to issue notice under Section 106 of the T. P Act does not arise. Then it is contended on the basis of the judgment of Rajasthan High Court reported in Bhura vs. Bahadur Singh that the notice under Section 111 (g) of the T. P. Act is mandatory for forfeiture. Since no notice is issued the suit is not maintainable that was also negatived by the court below. Sri Ranganatham, learned counsel for the appellants has contended that by operation of Section 111 (g) notice of forfeiture is necessary. In this case no such notice has been issued. Therefore the decree of the court below is vitiated by substtantial question of law warranting admission. I find no force in the contention section 111 (g) postulates forfeiture thus : " (1) In case the lessee breaks an express condition which provides that on breach thereof the lessor may re-enter or (2) in case the lessee renounces his character as such by setting up a title in a third person or by claiming title in himself or the lessee is adjudicated an. insolvent and the lease provides that the lessor may re-enter on the happening of such event and in any of these cases, ths lessor or his transferee gives notice in writing to the lessee of his intention to determine the lease, the lease is determined. "

( 2 ) THEREFORE the existence of the lease and the consequential juralrelationship of lessor and lessee between the parties is a condition precedent for the applicability of Section 111 (g) of the T. P. Act. In this case the agreement of sale does not create any title. Therefore mere assertion of the appellants that they came into possession by virtue of an agreement of sale entered into between themselves and the step-son of the plaintiff, does not create any title in the appellants. Therefore the question of thier setting up a title in themselves does not arise. The definite case of the appellants is that there is no jural relationship of landlord and tenant between the respondent and the appellants. Under those circumstances the renouncing of the character as a lessee and setting up a title in themselves does not arise. It is not the case that any lease is executed by the respondent, in view of the fact that the appellants themselves are renouncing the character as a lessee. Thus considered the issue of notice of forfeiture does not arise. The court below has rightly distinguished the ratio Bhura vs. Bahadur Singh (supra) relied on. In that case it was