The liability of a carrier under the Carriage by Air Act, 1972 is a statutory one and the carrier cannot set-off any collateral benefits received by the appellants against the damages payable under the Act.

( 1 ) JUDGEMENT :- An interesting but difficult question of law has arisen, though through old moorings, but sprouted from virgin soil i. e. , the Carriage by Air Act, 197 (Act 69 of 1972), for short, "the Act", viz. , whether the collateral benefits accrued out of the death of a passenger in an accident on an international carriage, would be a set-off from liquidated damages under the Act. It exacted considerable anxiety and thought as this question has not arisen so far in any Court of the High Contracting Parties. The undisputed facts lie in a short compass which are stated thus : The unsuccessful plaintiffs-appellants suit for recovery of Rs. 1,22,200/- as damages was entailed with dismissal. The first appellant is the widow, the second and third are the son and daughter respectively of one K. Adinarayana. When he was travelling on an International carriage - Air Craft No. VT-DWN on Airway ticket, when the Aircraft was to reach Bombay on Oct. 12, 1976, it crashed in which Adinarayana died. The respondent issued notice Ex. A-1 dated Nov. 22, 1976, calling upon the appellants to furnish the particulars so as to settle the claim for damages. Pursuant thereto the suit claim was made; correspondence ensued and by telegram Ex. A-28 dated Aug. 1, 1977, the respondent withdrew the offer to pay Rs. 1,20,00/- towards the liability followed by a suit notice Ex. A-13 dated Aug. 20, 1977 and reply thereto under Ex. A-14 dated Aug. 22, 1977 leading to lay the action in the suit. In its defence, the respondent admitted its liability to pay the damages for loss of life of the passenger Adinarayana, for short, "the deceased" but pleaded set-off of a sum of Rs. 2,00,000/- received by the appellant from the Personal Accident Insurance Policy and thereby its liability under the Act stood discharged. It is further pleaded that the appellants suppressed the factum of their receipt and played fraud on the respondent and as a consequence the contract became void. As a result, it is not liable to pay the suit claim. On framing appropriate issues, adduction of evidence and consideration there of, the trial Court dismissed the suit on the ground that the appellants suppressed the material fact of receipt of Rupees two lakhs and thereby they played fraud on the respondent. Accordingly, the contract comes to a terminus. Thereby the suit cannot be decreed. Thus the appeal.

( 2 ) SRI Rajeswara Rao, learned senior counsel for the appellants has contended that under the Act, the liability of the carrier has been fixed at 2,50,000 Francs equivalent to Rs. 1,75,000/- and under Schedule II thereof the liability is the maximum. This is a statutory liability bereft of power to claim any deduction from and out of any benefits received by the appellants towards personal Accident Insurance Policy. The Respondent cannot be relieved of that liability. Accordingly the suit is to be decreed.

( 3 ) SRI Ratnakar, learned counsel for the respondent, agreeing that the liability is of 2,50,000 francs equivalent to Indian currency of Rs. 1,75,000/-, contended that it is only as outer limit prescribed under the statute but any other benefit received out of the death of the deceased has to be given set-off before claiming amounts under the Act. Since the appellants have received Rupees two lakhs from Personal Accident Insurance Policy, the respondent is absolved of its liability under the Act. Accordingly, the decree of dismissal can be sustained on that ground. He referred to me the several provisions in the Conventions, the allied Acts in England, the Commentaries thereon, to which I would refer to at the appropriate stage.

( 4 ) THE respective contentions give rise to the question whether or not the respondent is entitled to plead set-off of any collateral benefit received by the appellants otherwise than under the Act in discharging the liability of the damages payable under the Act. At the outset it may be stated in fairness to the respondent and its c