Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : A.RAGHUVIR, P.KODANDA RAMAYYA, RAMA RAO, T.LAKSHMI NARAYANA REDDY, UPENDRA LAL WAGHRAY
Rayani Appaiah - Appellant
Versus
Spl Tahsildar L.R.Addankl - Respondent
C.R.P. No. 2035 & 2036/78
Decided On : 09-25-87
Advocates Appeared :
Sri C. Poornaiah
Held : (Per majority Ramarao J.)
The wife or widow is not entitled to share in her own right in partition of co-parcenery property. Section 6 is primarily confined to the interruption of devolution by survivorship in the event of presence of female heir and the heirs set out in class 1 of the schedule are specified as heirs. The fiction embodied in the proviso has a procedural trapping whereby the partition is considered to be at large necessitating the consideration of the slices of all the other shares to arrive at the ratio of the share of the deceased. Section 6 cannot be stretched beyond this and the right of the wife or the widow to claim share in her own right does not flow from the veins of Section 6.
A wife or mother has no right to claim a share during the life time of her husband in joint family property. Such a right was conferred on her for the first time after the death of her husband under the provisions of the Hindu Woman s Rights to Property Act, 1937. However, that Act was repealed by the Hindu Succession Act. Hence, if the death of the husband takes place after the commencement of the Hindu Succession Act, she is entitled to a share as heir as provided in Section 8 read with Schedule 1.
AIR 1974 A.P. 130 Full Bench Approved 1979 (1) APU 318 Approved 1979 (2) APU 141 overruled
(Contra Per Raghuvir J.)
Act 30 of 1956 is a central enactment. The Act applies all over the country including South India. The decision of the Supreme Court is applicable to South India. The interpretation of Secs.4, 6 and its proviso and the Explanation 1 altered the law in South India as it has altered the Mitakshara Practised in Maharashtra.
(Per Upendralal Waghray J.)
The principle of survivorship does not make any distinction to various sub schools of Mitakshara. There is no specific provision for ascertainment of the interest of a deceased governed by Mitakshara in a coparcenary property. According to Sec.14 (1) any property possessed by a female Hindu shall be held by her as a full owner. The Explanation to the said sub-section defines "property·, widely and includes property acquired by a female at a partition. This implies that a female is also entitled to a share in a partition of coparcenary, as otherwise, the words "property acquired at a partition" would became unnecessary because the Explanation also uses the words "property acquired by inheritance or devise". Such a partition can refer only to a Mitakshara coparcenary which is also evident from the fact that proviso to Sec. 6 also makes a reference to the same.
( 1 ) MAJORITY view : The questions referred to the larger Bench are : (1) What is the mode of determination of widow s interest in coparcenary property in Southern India ? (2) Can she claim any share in the joint family property ?
( 2 ) THE essential consideration is whether the ratiocination in the Full Bench decision of this Court in a Seethamahalakshmamma v Y. Chalamaiah (1) AIR 1974 A P 130 holding that the wife is not entitled to a share in a partition of coparcenary property among father and eons of a Hindu family governed by madras school of Mitakshara is a good law in view of Section 6 of the Hindu succession Act and the decision of the supreme Court in Gurupad v Hirabai (2) air 1976 S C 1239.
( 3 ) THE Hindu law is the spin-off of vedas, Smritis. commenteries and digests legislative enactments and judicial decisions. Several commentaries and digests were compiled as to the essence of shastric law expounded in Vedas and smrithis and the commentaries and digests of Mitakshara and Viramitrodava and Jimuta Vahanas are accented with solemnity and reverence by people The commentaries are the amalgam of distillation of ancient Sutras and preponderance usage and custom in the community and it is a happy blend ironing out the inconsistencies and angularities. The origin and development of schools of hindu Law is traced by the Privy Council in Collector of Madura v Mootto Ramalinga (3) 12 M I A 397 as follows :"the remoter sources of Hindu Law are common to all the different schools the process by which those schools have been developed seems to have been of this kind. Works universally or generally viewed became the subject of subsequent commentaries. The commentator put his own gloss on the ancient text and his authority having been received in one and rejected in another part of India, schools with conflicting dectrine arose". The commentaries of Mitakshara in general and particularly the commentary on yajnavalkya are followed through out india except Bengal. In Bangala area the chief commentary is that of Jimutavahana and it is called Dayabegha. By efflux of time diverse interpretations rendered by commentators as to subtle and complex dimensions and also bowing to usage the mitakshara doctrine sprouted off-shoots with slightly different shades of opinion designated as Madras, Bombay, Benaras and Mithila schools of Hindu law. The essence of Mitakshara doctrine permeated through all these schools and there are slight variations as a result of different approaches and accent by certain treatises and commentaries influenced by local custom and usage. Smriti Chandrika and saraswati Vilas considered to be the prominent exponents of Mitakshara supplement but not supersede Mitakshara. The commentators endeavoured to string shades and hues in Shastras. As pointed out by the Privy Council in Budha Singh v Laithi Singh (37 All 604) these treatises can be called upon to "explain a dubious or interminate phase of term in the Mitakshara". The difference between Mitakshara and Dayabhaga schools are vital. In Mitakshara school, the son gets a right to the joint family property by birth and can demand partition during the father s life-time. But in Dayabhaga school the son is precluded from demanding partition during the life time of the father and the father is considered as absolute owner of the property. Under Mitakshara law, the widow of a deceased coparcener cannot enforce partition of her husband s share against his brothers but under the dayabhaga school s h e is entitled t o demand partition.
( 4 ) IT is not out of context to refer to Kautilya s Arthasastra translated for the first time by Shama Sastry. By caption this compilation is popularly understood as treatise or articulation of financial set up. But, however, it embraces all aspects of law, viz. , state-craft, administration of justice, legal procedure, woman s rights, marriage, divorce, fiseal measures, sociology, philosophy etc. But, however it is considered a
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