B. P. JEEVAN REDDY, J.

( 1 ) IN the recent years, this Court is being flooded with writ petitions relating to the conditions of service of the state Government employees notwithstanding the constitution of a special and exclusive Tribunal to adjudicate upon the same. Under Art 371-D of the Constitution and the Presidential Order issued thereunder, the Andhra Pradesh Administrative tribunal has been constituted, to the exclusion of the High Court, to adjudicate upon the service conditions of the employees of the State Government.

( 2 ) THE constitutionality of Art. 371-D has been questioned both in supreme Court and this Court, but, for reasons not relevant here, the issue has remained undecided.

( 3 ) THE petitioners approaching this Court, ignoring the Tribunal, assign the following reasons for not going to tribunal and for approaching this Court: (a) the Tribunal has no power to pass exparte interim orders; it has necessarily to give a week notice to the concerned authority before passing interim orders; meanwhile the impugned order is implemented and it is argued that since the order is already implemented, no interim order can by passed; the petitioner thus suffers, in msnv cases, uncalled for prejudice, though he may succeed ultimately; (b) the orders of the Tribunal, both interim and final, are not being implemented by the Government, even where they are not annulled under Clause (5 ). There is no machinery available to the Tribunal to enforce its oiders it has no power to punish any one for contempt thus the petitioners have to wait upon the pleasure of the Government/authority to implement the order, in it s own time and manner. The petitioners are thus in a helpless situation, they cannot go to Supreme Court, since they have succeeded before the Tribunal at the same time, the fruits of the order are not available to them. The Government neither goes to Supreme Court against the order, nor does it implement; and (c) the power of annulment conferred upon tha Government by Clause (5) of Art. 371-D, is an unguided and absolute power.

( 4 ) IT cannot be said that there is no force in complaints (b) and (c ). So far as complaint (a) is concerned, I see no force in it. Probably, the requirement of notice to the authority;/govt. before passing the interim order is a desirable one. But it is not correct to say that the tribunal is bereft of the power to pass appropriale interim orders, just because the impugned order is said to have been implemented. Such an interpretation would make the very power and its conferment meaningless. Reasonably understood, it means that even where the order is said to have been implemented, the tribunal can pass such appropriate interim orders as the situation may call for. Moreover, it is important to remember that whereas a final order passed by the Tribunal bscones effective and enforceable after the expiry of three months (see Ciauso (5) of Art. 371-D, the interim order is effective the moment it is passed, though it may be that the powar of annulment extends to both the orders. Until annulled, the interim order is erffective and enforceable. Now coming to complaint (b), the justification behind it is undeniable. It is also tually not incorrect. Not that, all orders of the Tribunal are being ignored; some are and yet some others are being implemented at the leisure and pleasure of the Government/authority, Indeed, in the recent months this Court has seen a spate of writ petitions to direct the respondent Government/authority to implement the order of the Tribunal, which has become effective. Such directions are being given as a concomitant of Rule of Law. So far as complaint (c) is concerned, it is equally justifiable, though its rigour has been reduced in the recent months as a result of the decisions of this Court, holding that the government must hear the affected party before annulling the order.

( 5 ) NOW the situation is this: An interim order passed by tha Tribunal is effective forthwit

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