( 1 ) THE appellant herein filed the suit for partition and separate possession of her share in the plaint schedule house situated in Nizamabad town (hereinafter referred to as the suit property ). The suit was decreed by the learned Additional District Munsif, Nizamabad. But on an appeal preferred by defendants 3 and 4, the learned District Judge, Nizamabad allowed the appeal and set aside the decree. Aggrieved by the said decision the plaintiff preferred the above Second Appeal.

( 2 ) ADMITTEDLY the suit property belongs to one Samba Shastry. He had four sons by name Narasimha Sastry, Ram Shastry, Vittal Shastry and rajeshwar Shastry. All the four sons died leaving their respective heirs. The plaintiff is the widow of Rajeshwar Shastry and the defendants are the heirs of the other three brothers of whom defendants 3 and 4 are the wife and son respectively of Vittal Shastry.

( 3 ) THE learned counsel for the appellant argued that the trial Court has found that the suit property constitutes the joint family property of the plaintiff and defendants ; that the husband of the plaintiff and the husband of the 5th defendant have not relinquished their right during their life time over the suit property ; that the plaintiff s husband and the husband of the 3rd defendant did not go in illatom adoption 50 years ago; that the defendants nave failed to establish the construction of the suit house by them or that the joint family funds were utilised for the construction and that the plaintiff has a share in the suit property ; that the lower appellate court has taken all irrelevant considerations in reversing the findings of the trial Court; that the lower appellate Court placed reliance on the shares claimed in the notices and the delay in issuing the notices ; that so long as the suit is filed within the period of limitation, that cannot be taken as a ground to nonsuit the plaintiff, that the plaintiff s husband has contributed to the tune of rs. 10,000/ -. or Rs. 15,000/- for effecting repairs to the suit property : that even otherwise he does not forego his share in the joint family property ; that the burden is on the defendants to prove the relinquishment and that in the absence of relinquishment deed, the learned appellate Judge has committed an error in inferring relinquishment from the circumstances.

( 4 ) THE learned counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, argued that after the death of Samba Shastry the husband of the 3rd defendant and the father of defendants 1 and 2 alone were residing in the suit premises ; that D. Ws. 5 and 7 deposed to the relinquishment; that the lower appellate Court found as a fact that there was a relinquishment; that when one of the sharers relinquishes his share in favour of other coparceners, no deed is necessary ; that each coparcener has only joint interest in the property and that the relinquishment of share of one of the coparceners does not involve transfer of property.

( 5 ) THE substantial question of law on which the Second Appeal was admitted is whether a relinquishment can be inferred from the circumstances and whether without registration it is valid and binding. The learned counsel for the appellant did not press the second part stating that there are decisions on either side. The only question, therefore, that arises for consideration in the second appeal is whether relinquishment of the share of a coparcener in the joint family property must be evidenced by a document in writing or whether it can be inferred from circumstances.

( 6 ) SECTION 5 of the Transfer of Property Act defines "transfer of property" as an act by which a living person "conveys" property, in present or in future, to one or more other living persons or to himself. Therefore the performance of an act by a person will operate as a transfer of property only if by such an act he "conveys" property to another. It implies that the person conveying the property is entitled to the property sough