AMARESWARI RAMANUJULU NAIDU, J.

( 1 ) THIS Civil Misc. Second Appeal arises out of execution proceedings. The question pertains to limitation. Both the Courts have held that the Execution Petition is time barred. The decree-holder is the petitioner.

( 2 ) A few dates are relevant. The decree is dated 2-8-58. The Execution Petition is filed on 7-7-72. The contention of the decree-holder was that the decree was executable only on production of succession certificate and since the succession certificate was produced on 20-7-1980 (sic) limitation starts from that date as the decree became executable on that and not from 28-8-1958 when the judgment was delivered and decree was passed. The trial Court rejected this contention and the same was affirmed by the Appellate Court. The second point argued on behalf of the decree-holder was that since the decree dt. 28-8-1958 was amended on 6-1-1961, limitation starts from 6-1-61 and not from the date of the decree. The contention was also rejected by both the Courts.

( 3 ) MR. N. Rajeswara Rao, the learned counsel for the appellant reiterated the same contentions before me. As can be seen from the facts, the decree was passed on 28-1-1958 and the Execution Petition was filed on 7-7-1972. Calculated from the date of the decree, the Execution Petition is beyond 12 years. Under Art. 136 of the Limitation Act, time beings to run when the decree or order becomes enforceable and the period of limitation is 12 years. It is no doubt true that the decree-holder was entitled to execute the decree only on production of succession certificate. But that does not mean that the decree itself was enforceable. The decree was passed by a Court of competent jurisdiction and it was enforceable from the very day when it was passed. The inability of the decree-holder to execute the decree due to some lapse on his part does not render the decree unforceable. If the succession certificate was in the hands of the decree-holder by the time the decree was passed, he could have enforced it from that very day. The right to execute the decree is different from the decree being enforceable. A distinction between these two causes is always maintained.

( 4 ) IN Yeshwant v. Walchand, AIR 1951 SC 16 the Supreme Court held that the decree is not a conditional one in the sense that some extraneous events were to happen on the fulfilment of it alone it can be executed and that the payment of court-fee on the amount found due to the decree-holder was entirely in the power of decree-holder and there was nothing to prevent him from paying it then and there and that a decree which can be executed by the decree-holder only after payment of the Court-fee was a decree capable of execution from the very date, it was passed. Applying the principle enunciated in this case, I have no doubt, in holding that the decree was enforceable from the day when it was passed and this is not a case of unenforceability of the decree, but is a case where the decree-holder being unable to execute the Degree due to non-fulfilment of certain conditions by him.

( 5 ) IT is submitted by Mr. Rajeswara Rao that the decree was drafted only after the production of the succession certificate and therefore, the decree became enforceable only from the date of drafting. According to Order 20, R. 7 C. P. C. , the date of the decree should be the date on which the judgment was pronounced and not the date on which it was actually signed by the Judge. Hence I find no force in this contention.

( 6 ) THE next submission of Mr. N. Rajeswara Rao, the learned counsel for the appellant was that the decree passed on 28-8-1958 was amended on 6-1-1961 and time begins to run from the date of the amended decree. If the date of the amended decree is to be taken in to account, the execution petition is in time. Therefore, the question for consideration is whether time begins to run from the date of the original decree or from the date of the amended decree. In this case, the origin

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