( 1 ) THE defendant is the appellant. The trial Court dismissed the suit. On appeal, the appellate Court allowed the appeal and decreed the suit. Thus this second Appeal.

( 2 ) THE respondent laid the suit on November, 13, 1978 for a specified sum of money contending that he entrusted a gold jewel weighing five tolas to the appellant to secure money and he promised to return the same within two months thereafter. In spite of several demands, it was not returned. He also got issued a notice. Ex. A-l on June, 25, 1978 for which the appellant issued a relpy Ex. A-2, dated July, 2, 1978 refusing to return the jewel entrusted to him. The trial Court held that the entrustment was made in 1975 and it was to be returned within two months the reafier and since the suit was not filed within three years thereafter, the suit is barred by limitation. On appeal the appeallate Court did not agree with the trial Court and held that the appropriate article of Limitation Act that would apply is Article 91 (b) and applying that Article, the suit has been decreed.

( 3 ) SRI V. Jagannadha Rao, learned counsel for the appellant contends that the lower Appellate Court is clearly in error in applying article 91 (b) of the Limitation Act. For application of Article 91 (b) he contends that there must be proof of entrustment and wrongful refusal of delivery of possession thereof by the bailee and unless these findings are given Article 91 (b) has no application. Though the respondent has been served, he is not appearing either in person or through a counsel.

( 4 ) THEREFORE, the question that arises for consideration is, what is the appropriate Article of the Limitation Act that would apply to the facts of this case.

( 5 ) THE fact found by the appellate Court is that the gold jewel weighing five tolas was entrusted to the appellant for securing the loan on pledging it with a promise to return within two months thereof, thereby it became bailment and the appellant is bailee. Section 148 of the Contract act, posits that bailment is delivery of goods by one person to another for some purpose, upon a contract that they shall when the purpose is accomplished, be returned to dispose of according to the direction of the person delivering them. The limitation begins to run only when the bailee refuses to deliver the jewel on demand having been made by the bailor.

( 6 ) ARTICLE 91 (b) of Schedule II of the Limitation Act, 1963 (36 of 1963) for short, the Act postulates thus:

91. For compensation,

(b) for wrongfully taking . three When the property

or injuring or wrongfully . years. . . is wrongfully taken

fully detaining any . . . . or injured, or when

other specific moveable . . . . the detainer s possession

property. . . . . becomes unlawful. ".

the period of limitation prescribed under this Article is three years. The limitation begins to run when the property is wrongfully taken or enjoyed or when the defendant s possession becomes unlawful. When movable property was entrusted, the possession thereof continues to be lawful till date of demand and the retention thereafter becomes wrongful. As a consequence the possession of the detainer becomes unlawful from that date. Therefore, making a demand and refusal are essential, concomitants for application of Article 91 (b) of the Act. The nomenclature or the nature of the relief is not a conclusive postulate. Mere expiry of the period prescribed under the contract does not give rise to start running of ex. limitation. In the case on hand, a demand was made by issue of the notice Ex. A-1, on June 25, 1978 to which a reply was given under ex. A-2, dt. July 2, 1978. In the reply he denied the liability to return the jewel and thereby the possession of the gold jewel with the appellant became wrongful and limitation begins to run from that date. The suit was filed on November 13, 1978. In Gopalaswamiayyar vs. Subraminia Sastri a Division Bench of the Madras High Court following its earlier view in subb