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1982 Supreme(AP) 303

Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : A.SEETHARAM REDDY
Kishan Chand - Appellant
Versus
Sayeeda Khatoon - Respondent
Decided On : 08-31-82

The second limb of Section 110 T. P. Act does not provide for the exclusion of the date of commencement of the lease in computing the time for the notice to quit.

Headnote:

LEASE - TERMINATION - NOTICE - COMPUTATION OF TIME - SECTION 110 T. P. ACT - SECOND LIMB - EXCLUSION OF DATE OF COMMENCEMENT - NOT PERMISSIBLE - NOTICE TO QUIT - VALIDITY.

Fact of the Case:

A tenant challenged the validity of a notice to quit issued by the landlord, arguing that it did not comply with the provisions of Section 110 of the Transfer of Property Act (T. P. Act). The lease agreement was silent on the commencement date of the lease, and the tenant contended that the first day of the implied commencement should be excluded in computing the time within which the notice should be given.

Finding of the Court:

The court held that the second limb of Section 110 T. P. Act, which provides a deeming provision for the commencement of a lease when the instrument of lease is silent, does not provide for the exclusion of any day in the process of computation of the period within which the notice has to be issued. Therefore, the date on which the lease commenced should be included in computing the period of limitation for the notice to quit.

Issues: 1. Whether the second limb of Section 110 T. P. Act excludes the date of commencement of the lease in computing the time for the notice to quit? 2. Whether the notice to quit issued by the landlord was valid?

Ratio Decidendi: The court interpreted the language of Section 110 T. P. Act and found that the second limb of the section only explains the position that when the date of commencement is not mentioned in the instrument of lease, it must be deemed to commence from the date of making of the lease itself. The court held that there is nothing in the language of the section that suggests that the date of commencement should be excluded in computing the period of limitation for the notice to quit.

Final Decision: The court dismissed the tenant's appeal and upheld the validity of the notice to quit. The court also granted the tenant six months' time to vacate the premises, provided that he paid the agreed rent regularly.

A. SEETARAM REDDY, J.

( 1 ) THIS rent revision by the tenant raises a sole but rather important question as to whether as to whether under sec. 110 of the T. P. Act if the instrument of lease is silent with regard to the commencement of the lease, the first day as per the implied commencement within the meaning of second limb of sec. 110 will have to be excluded in computing the time. Within which a notice to be given by landlord for the termination of tenancy.

( 2 ) THE format of the case in brief is The lease agreement was entered into on 16/02/1971 a between the revisionist-tenant and the landlady-respondent in respect of the demised premises, H. No. 3-3-71/2. Kachiguda, hyderabad, on a monthly rent of Rs. 150. 00 for a period of eleven months with a stipulation therein that the tenancy may be continued by the landlady after the expiry of eleven months on the same terms and conditions after the stipulated period the tenancy, however continued and came to be treated as a tenancy by holding over from month to month. After a decade the landlady gave a notice of termination under Ex. A-7 stating that the tenant has contravened the stipulation of the lease agreement by using the premises for running N. K. Cottage Industry which has materially impaired the value and damaged the premises. This notice was given on 20/10/1979 stating therein that the tenant shall vacate the premises by the mid-night of 15/ 16/12/1979.

( 3 ) THE rent court, on the basis of the evidence, both documentary and oral held that though the tenant has not been in a position to establish that the premises have been let out for manufacturing purposes but however since the quite notice is not in conformity with the provisions enacted under sec. 110 T. P. Act, as the day of commencement for the purpose of reckoning the period of computation in regard to the notice will have to be excluded viz. , 16/12/1979 the right to terminate by the landlady is defeated and thereby the eviction petition was dismissed. On appeal the rent Appellate Court, however allowed it holding sec 110 T. P. Act is not available to the tenant inasmuch as the second limb of that section explains by deeming provision, as to when the lease commences, but it does not provide for exclusion of any day in the process of computation of the period within which (notice) has to be issued. Secondly it held that even on the basis of the evidence the premises have been used much later to the letting out for the purpose of manufacturing lamps. It is the original intention of the parties that has to be gathered from the instrument. Admittedly, since at the initial stage when the premises any subsequent usage of it for manufacturing purposes would not render the premises. As one let for manufacturing purpose and therefore, six months notice need not be issued as contemplated under sec. 106 T. P. Act, hence this second appeal.

( 4 ) AT the time of admission of this second appeal the substantial question of law that was framed by this Court is as under:-"the substantial question of law that arises for consideration among other grounds is whether in view of the admission of the plaintiff contained in the memo filed before the trial Court the lease could be deemed to be a lease for manufacturing purposes and if so whether after the expiry of the first 11 months will it be deemed to be a lease for one year and terminable on 6 months notice or a lease from month to month terminable on 15 days notice ending with the monthly tenancy?"

( 5 ) SRI Ugle, the learned counsel for the appellant, raises the following contentions:- 1. Notice under Ex. A-7 to quite issued by the landlady on 20/10/1979 is defective, as it is not in conformity with the provisions enacted under sec. 110 T. P. Act. 2. The lease agreement Ex. A-1 being silent on the nature of commencement of the lease, it should be presumed under sec. 110 T. P. Act that it commenced on the day when the lease commenced and therefore the day on which the notice is gi











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