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Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : A.SEETHARAM REDDY
Bondili Satyanarayana Singh - Appellant
Versus
Sri Rajagppaiaswamy vari Devasthanam madhavaripalem represented by the executive Officer - Respondent
Decided On : 12-18-82
TRANSFER OF PROPERTY ACT - SECTION 106 - NOTICE TO QUIT - VALIDITY - REQUIREMENTS - INTERPRETATION - EFFECT OF LOCAL LAW OR CONTRACT - JURISDICTION OF CIVIL COURTS - RECOVERY OF ARREARS OF RENT AND DAMAGES.
Fact of the Case:
The appellant, a tenant in a tea shop owned by the respondent Devasthanam, challenged the validity of a quit notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, claiming it did not comply with the provisions of the Act. The appellant also argued that the Civil Court lacked jurisdiction to hear the suit as the respondent should have followed the procedure laid down in the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act.
Finding of the Court:
The Court held that the quit notice was valid as it was issued in accordance with the provisions of Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act. The Court further held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear the suit as the respondent sought reliefs, namely arrears of rent and damages, which were not provided for under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act.
Issues: 1. Whether the quit notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act was valid? 2. Whether the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear the suit?
Ratio Decidendi: 1. The Court interpreted Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act and held that the quit notice was valid as it was issued in accordance with the provisions of the Act. The Court noted that the notice was in writing, signed by the respondent, and delivered to the appellant. The Court also held that the notice period of one month was reasonable and did not violate the provisions of the Act. 2. The Court held that the Civil Court had jurisdiction to hear the suit as the respondent sought reliefs, namely arrears of rent and damages, which were not provided for under the Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act. The Court relied on the principle that a plaintiff cannot be compelled to split up his cause of action and seek redress partly in a Civil Court and partly before a special tribunal.
Final Decision: The Court dismissed the appellant's Second Appeal and upheld the decree of the lower courts. The appellant was given three months to vacate the premises, provided he paid the agreed rent regularly. In default, he would be liable for eviction forthwith.
( 1 ) THE substantial question of law framed in this Second Appeal, is, the Courts below failed to note that the quit notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, (hereinafter called the Act) is not a valid notice in the eye of law as it was issued on 27-6-1979; whereas the tenancy starts from first of every month and in order to evict the appellant, the plaintiff- Devasthanam, should have issued 15 days clear days notice on the first of succeeding month and should have given 15 days time; in the absence of which, the quit notice itself is invalid and cannot be acted upon.
( 2 ) THE relevant facts may be noticed :- The respondent - Devasthanam, filed a suit for the recovery of possession of the suit premises (wherein appellant herein is running a Tea shop), arrears of rent and damages. Before filing the suit, a notice dated 27-6-1969 (Ex. A-1) under Section 106 of the Act, was issued which was suitably replied by the appellant s advocate on 7-7-1969. Thereafter the suit was laid. Both the Courts below held that the suit notice was valid and therefore the suit must be decreed. The decree was only confined to possession and not to arrears of rent or damages as it was held that the plaintiff was not entitled to them.
( 3 ) IN this Second Appeal, two contentions are raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, one is that the suit notice under Ex. A-1 dated 27-6-1969, is not a valid one as it does not accord with the spirit and language of Sec. 106 of the Act. The submission is based on the ground that the suit notice issued on 27-6-1969, says that "from the date of the receipt of the notice, within one month thereof, the appellant herein shall vacate the premises and give delivery of possession of the property and also pay arrears of rent. "
( 4 ) BASED on this, the learned counsel submits that the one month s time which is stipulated in the notice, does not synchronise with the end of the tenancy month as it would end on 27-7-1969 only and therefore this is invalid both under Sec. 106 of the act and on authority. In Bhagabandas v. Bhagwandas (1) AIR 1977 S. C. 1120, on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appelant, it was held that, "it is indisputable that under Section 106 of the Transfer of property Act the notice to quit must expire with the end of the month of the tenancy or in other words, it must terminate the tenancy with effect from the expiration of the month of the tenancy. If it terminates the tenancy with effect from an earlier date, it would be clearly invalid. Now, here the notice to quit required the respondents to vacate the premises "within the month of October 1982" and intimated to them that otherwise they would be "treated as trespassers from 1st November" in respect of the premises. The question is: What is the meaning and effect of the words "with in the month of October 1962" in the context in which they are used in the notice to quit? Do these words mean that the tenancy of the respondents was sought to be terminated at a date earlier than the expiration of the month of October 1962 and they were required to vacate the premises before such expiration? We do not think so. When the notice to quit required the respondents to vacate "within the month of october 1962", what it meant was that the respondents could vacate it any time within the month of October 1962 but not later than the expiration of that month The last moment upto which the respondents could, according to the notice to quit, lawfully continue to remain in possession of the premises was the mid-night of 31st October, 1962. We fail to see any difference"between a notice asking a tenant to vacate "within the month of October 1962" and a notice requiring a tenant to vacate a latest by the mid-night of 31st October, 1962; because in both cases, the tenant would be entitled to occupy the premises upto the expiration of 31st October, 1962 but not beyond it. This position would seem to
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