1982 Supreme(AP) 492
Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : A.SEETHARAM REDDY
BONDILL SATYANARAY ANA SINGH - Appellant
Versus
RAJAGOPALASWAMY VARI DERASTHAAAM, MADHAVARIPALEM - Respondent
S.A.No.734/81
Decided On : 12-08-82
Advocates Appeared :
Mr. K.S. Ramachandra Murthy, Mr. M. Adinarayana Raju
Headnote:AP CHARITABLE AND HINDU RELIGIOUS INSTITUTION AND ENDOWMENTS ACT Secs 75 and 76 and Transfer of Property Act Sec 106 - Suit for recovery of possession after evicting the tenant and (or recovery of rent and damages - Maintainable
Held: It is true that Sec 106 of the Transfer of Property Act postulates that if there is a local law, then that would govern the situation It is not In dispute that the case is governed by local law viz, Andhara Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act But that by itself does not preclude he plaintiff from seeking relief, If he has to seek one or more of the reliefs, which are not governed by the local law In as much as the local law viz Andhra Pradesh Charitable and Hindu Religious Institutions and Endowments Act, does not make any provision for the recovery of arrears of rent or damages, it is certainly open to the respondent temple to resort to a civil suit as it cannot be compelled to split the reliefs
SA Dismissed
( 1 ) THE substantial question of law framed in this Second Appeal is, the Courts below failed to note that the quit notice issued under Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act, (hereinafter called the Act) is not a valid notice in the eye of law as it was issued on 27-6-1969 ; whereas the tenancy starts from first of every month, and in order to evict the appellant, the plaintiff-Devasthanam, should have issued 15 days clear days notice on the first of succeeding month and should have given 15 days time ; in the absence of which, the quit notice itself is invalid and cannot be acted upon.
( 2 ) THE relevant facts may be noticed :. The respondent - Devasthanam, filed a suit for the recovery of possession of the suit premises (wherein the appellant herein is running a Tea shop), arrears of rent and damages. Before filing the suit, a notice dated 27-6-1969 (Ex. A-1) under section 106 of the Act, was issued which was suitable replied by the appellant s advocate on 7-7-1969. Thereafter the suit was laid. Both the courts below held that the suit notice was valid and therefore the suit mast be decreed. The decree was only confined to possession and not to arrears of rent or damages as it was held that the plantiff was not entitled to them.
( 3 ) IN this Second Appeal two contentions are raised by the learned counsel for the appellant, one is that the suit notice under Ex,a-1 dated 27-6-1969, is not a valid one as it does not accord with the spirit and language Sec. 106 of the Act. The submission is based on the ground that the suit notice issued on 27-6-1969, says that , from the date of the receipt of the notice, within one month thereof, the appellant herein shall vacate the premises and give delivery of possession of the property and also pay arrears of rent.
( 4 ) BASED on this, the learned counsel submits that the one month s time which is stipulated in the notice, does not synchronise with the end of the tenancy month as it would end on 27-7-1969 only and therefore this is invalid both under Sec. 106 of the Act and on authority. In Bhagabaabandas v. Bhagwandas on which reliance was placed by the learned counsel for the appellant, it was held that. It is indisputable that under Section 106 of the Tranfer of property Act the notice to quit must expire with the end of the month of the tenancy or in other words, it must terminate the tenancy with effect from the expiration of the month or the tenancy. If it terminates the tenancy with effect from an earlier date, it would be clearly invalid. Now, here the notice to quit required the respondents to vacate the premises "within the month of October 1962" arid intimeted to them that otherwise they would be "treated as trespassers from 1st November" in respect of the premises. The question is : What is the meaning and effect of the words "within the month of October 1962" in the context in which they are used in the notice to quit? Do these words mean that the tenancy of the respondents was sought to be terminated at a date earlier than the expiration of ths month of October 1962 and they were required to vacate the premises before such exiration ? We do not think so. When the notice to quit required the respondents to vacate "within the month of October 1962", what it meant was that the respondents could vacate at any time within the month of October 1962 but not later than the expiration of that month. The last moment up to which the respondents could, according to the notice to quit, lawfully continue to remain in possession of the premises was the mid-night of 31st October, 1962. We fail to see any difference "between a notice asking a tenant to vacate "within the month of October 1962" and a notice requiring a tenant to vacate latest by the mid-night of 31st October, 1962, because in both cases, the tenant would be entitled to occupy the premises up to the expiration of 31st October, 1962 but not beyond it. This position would seem to follow logically an