Andhra Pradesh High Court
Judges : B.P.JEEVAN REDDY
P.Appalamurthy - Appellant
Versus
State OF A.P. - Respondent
W.P.No.2715/79 etc.
Decided On : 04-22-81
Advocates Appeared :
.
Held: Where the land owners do not in any manner contribute to the delay, the Land Acquisition Officer cannot sleep over the matter and take his own time for passing the award The statutory power conferred upon the State by the Act, viz the power of eminent domain should be exercised reasonably and fairly, which necessarily means that the award must be passed with reasonable expedition However, if there is any statutory prohibition which disables the Land Acquisition Officer from proceeding further, or from passing the award, or if any statutory provision which prohibits him from doing so, it would certainly constitute a valid explanation But, the Government cannot, on account of its expectations, anticipations and apprehensions, delay the proceedings over an unreasonably long delay and say that those expectations etc constitute a valid explanation for the delay
The scheme and intendment of the Act is that the award should be passed as early as possible in the circumstances of the case In this case, the Government was expecting that because of the Land Ceiling Act, or the Ceiling Act on Urban Vacant sites, it may get some lands at a very low compensation under those enactments and that, therefore, it need not proceed to acquire those lands at the market value under the Land Acquisition Act Every public authority is bound to act reasonably and fairly in exercise of its power An arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power cannot be countenanced by courts; more so, when it causes prejudice and loss to the citizens
WPs Allowed
( 1 ) THESE four writ petitions, which involve a common question of law, can be dealt with and disposed of together. In all these four writ petitions, notifications issued under Section 4 (1) of the Land Acquisition Act are being challenged, inter alia, on the ground that the Land Acquisition Officer has taken an inordinately and unreasonably long time for passing the award; or that no award has been passed in spite of lapse of such a long time, as the case may be.
( 2 ) SO far as W. P. No. 3907/1980 is concerned, the notification under Section 4 (1) was issued on 29-7-1971. Enquiry under Section 5-A was held, and the declaration under Section 6 was made on 7-12-1972. Then, after a delay of about three years, notices under Section 9 (3) and Section 10 were issued on 18-11-1975. The award was, however, passed only on 29-4-1980. Meanwhile, this writ petition was filed on 28-4-1980, and admitted on 29-4-1980. So far as W. P. No. 2715/79 is concerned, the notification under Section 4 (1) is dated 29-8-1968, and the declaration under Section 6 is dated 18-1-1970. Notices under Section s 9 (3) and 10 were issued even in Feb. , 1970 itself, but the award came to be passed only on 31-3-1979. Meanwhile, the writ petition was filed on 27-3-1979, and admitted on 29-3-1979. W. P. Nos. 5563 and 5564 of 1979 challenge the same notification, though by different parties, interested in different properties. The notification concerned in these two writ petitions is dated 2-8-1973. (Earlier a notification under Section 4 (1) was issued on 30-1-1969, but inasmuch as the declaration under Section 6 was made beyond three years, it lapsed and, accordingly, a fresh notification was issued on 2-8-1973 ). This notification invoked the power under Section 17 (4) of the Act and dispensed with the enquiry under Section 5-A. Thereafter, the declaration under Section 6 was made on 11-7-1974. No award was passed until the filing of the writ petitions. On 7-9-1979 this Court granted stay of all further proceedings, with the result that no award could be passed thereafter.
( 3 ) THE contention of the learned counsel for the petitioners is that, keeping the acquisition proceedings pending for such a long time, without passing the award and without paying the compensation to the owners, is an arbitrary and unreasonable exercise of power. It is argued that, according to law, the price payable is the market rate prevailing on the date of the notification under Section 4 (1 ). In that view of the matter, the acquisition proceedings must be concluded by the Land Acquisition Officer as early as possible, and without any avoidable delay. The delay of about 8 to 10 years --it is argued -- is unreasonable and oppressive, since by doing so, the owners are deprived of the fair equivalent. Over the last 8 to 10 years the prices have increased several-folds, and paying today the compensation at the rate prevailing about 8 to 10 years earlier is an abuse of power, and the provisions of the Act.
( 4 ) IN view of the above contentions, I called upon the learned counsel for the respondents to explain the reasons for delay in passing the awards. In fact, I gave an opportunity to the respondents counsel to file an additional counter-affidavit and also to place the necessary material before the Court, in that behalf. Accordingly, the counsel for the respondents has filed an additional counter-affidavit, and has also placed before me the several letters, memos and Orders of the Government, which I shall refer to presently. But, before doing that, it is well to mention that it is not the case of the counsel for the respondents that there was any statutory provision prohibiting, or disabling the Land Acquisition Officer from passing the award. The entire reliance is upon certain Government Orders. The first proceeding referred to is a letter from the Secretary to Government, Planning and Co-operation Department, dated 7-7-1972, addressed to the Chairman, Andhra
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