( 1 ) THE sole point, for consideration in this revision by the tenant of the suit premises is whether clause (b) of Sec. 10 (3) of the Andhra pradesh Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 (herinafter referred to as the Act ), is applicable to the case and whether the Life insurance Corporation would come within the ambit of the expression "public Institution" as mentioned in that clause.

( 2 ) IN order to appreciate this question it is necessary to refer to certain relevant facts. The Life Insurance Corporation is the owner of the suit premises which contains two shops. It has a building in which it has its office. It filed an eviction petition under Sec. 10 with a prayer to have the tenant vacated from the suit premises because the Life Insurance corporation wanted to expand its business. Both the lower authorities ordered eviction not under Sec. 10 (3) (b) but under Sec. 10 (3) (c) on the misunderstanding that these two shops are part of the building occupied by the Life Insurance Corporation.

( 3 ) THE learned advocate for the petitioners contended, in the first instance, that when both the lower authorities have applied Sec. 10 (3) (c) of the Act, it was their duty to give a finding under the proviso as to whether the hardship which may be caused to the tenant by granting it would out-weigh the advantage to the landlord and this is, according to the learned advocate, wanting in this case. I am of the opinion that under no circumstances would Sec. 10 (3) (c) of the Act apply to the case of this nature because to my mind Sec. 10 (3) (c) would apply only when a landlord is occupying a part of the building and wants the other part of the building as additional accommodation. The building occupied by the tenant should form part of the same premises which is occupied partly by the landlord. Then only Sec. 10 (3) (c) would apply in which case the proviso also would come into play.

( 4 ) TO my mind it is Sec. 10 (3) (b) which applies to the case on hand. Sec. 10 (3) (b) provides that where the landlord of a building whether residential or non-residential, is a religious, charitable educational or other public institution, it may if the building is required for the purposes of the institution, apply to the Controller subject to the provisions of clause (a) for an order directing the tenant to put the institution in possession of the building. I gave an opportunity to the learned advocates to argue on this aspect viz. as to whether clause (b) of Sec. 10 (3) would apply to the case on hand or not.

( 5 ) MR, Narasimha Rao, the learned advocate appearing on behalf of the petitioners tenants contended that the Life Insurance Corporation (respondent) cannot be considered a public Institution and therefore clause (b) has no application. Since no provisions are made under Sec. 10 (3) that when the landlord is in possession of a building of his own in a city, town or village, he could still ask for another building of his own for expansion of his business and in the absence of such a condition being incorporated in the Act for eviction, the petition ought to be dismissed. In support of his contention that the Life Insurance Corporation is not a public Institution , the learned advocate in the first instance argued that the principle of ejusdem generis should apply to the words other public institution and therefore the expression other public institution should be considered ejusdem generis along with religious, charitable or educational.

( 6 ) I regret I cannot accede to this contention the reason being that if the expression other public institution is considered as ejusdem generis to religious, charitable or educational, that would go against the intention of the legislature. If that were so, there could be other institutions which are not public in nature and therefore the Act would not apply to any other institution which is not religious, not charitable or not educational.

( 7 ) SECONDLY,